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COMING FULL CIRCLE: THE JOURNEY 
FROM SEPARATE BUT EQUAL TO 
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL SCHOOLS 
ROBERT A. GARDA, JR.* 
In this article, Professor Garda explains how the “separate but 
equal” doctrine rejected in Brown became the guiding principle in 
modern education reform.  He tracks the evolution of education reform 
from integration to finance reform to the standards based 
accountability and freedom of choice reforms embraced in the No 
Child Left Behind Act to explain why racially separate schools are no 
longer considered inherently unequal.  The desegregation movement’s 
failure to remedy the de facto school segregation resulting from private 
residential choice dovetailed with school finance reform to make 
“separate” schools socially acceptable, so long as the schools were 
equitably funded and the racial isolation was not state sanctioned.  
The political and legal blunting of school finance equity claims then 
coincided with the rise of educational “adequacy” claims, standards 
based accountability, and school choice further encouraging racial 
separation by promising meaningful equality through educational 
outcome parity and the liberty inherent in school choice.  Professor 
Garda explains why these reforms resulted in extreme racial and 
socioeconomic isolation of poor and minority students in the worst 
schools today, and why integration is not considered the solution 
despite its tested benefits.  By aligning the evolution of past reforms 
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with the current state of education and society’s refusal to pursue 
racial and socioeconomic integration, he explains why the schools of 
our future will remain separate and unequal. 
CONTENTS 
I INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 2 
II THE UNDERPINNINGS OF BROWN ............................................................................... 7 
III THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION LAW SINCE BROWN.............................................. 9 
A. 1954–1973: The Desegregation Movement................................................. 10 
B. 1973–1983: The Erosion of Integration and Resurrection of Resource 
Equality ............................................................................................................ 15 
C. 1983–2000: The Accountability and School Choice Movements ............ 22 
D. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ........................................................ 32 
IV THE PRESENT STATE OF EDUCATION REFORM ........................................................ 36 
A. Accountability, Finance Reform, Choice, and Integration. ...................... 37 
B. The Benefits of Integration and the Reasons it was Abandoned.............. 41 
C. Minorities in Today’s Schools ....................................................................... 50 
V THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION: SEPARATE BUT UNEQUAL........................................ 53 
A. Finance Litigation ........................................................................................... 54 
B. The NCLB ........................................................................................................ 63 
C. School Choice .................................................................................................. 75 
1. Vouchers .................................................................................................. 78 
2. Charter Schools ....................................................................................... 84 
VI CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 88 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
he United States public education system historically pursues 
equal educational opportunities for minorities through either 
resource equalization or integration.  Following the rise of 
mandatory public schooling in the late 1800s, educational 
institutions followed the route of “separate but equal” education for 
T 
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minorities endorsed by the Supreme Court in Plessey v. Ferguson.1  
Equality under state sponsored, or de jure, segregation was an 
illusion, and in 1954 the Supreme Court redirected education down 
the desegregation path to equality in Brown v. Board of Education.2  
For political, legal, and demographic reasons, the integration road 
appeared to be a dead end detour for minorities, and the education 
reform movement retreated back to seeking resource equalization 
through school finance litigation in the 1970s and 1980s.  When 
equal educational inputs for poor and minority students proved 
nearly impossible to attain in the 1990s, education reform pursued 
revolutionary new routes to equal educational opportunities for 
minorities: educational outcome equality by way of standards based 
accountability and freedom of choice through voucher programs and 
charter schools.  These new reform efforts entirely displaced 
integration as the primary means to attain educational equality and 
by the end of the century education is “going back to a kind of Plessey 
separate-but-equal world.”3 
Education reformers and the American public no longer 
subscribe to Brown’s admonition that separate schools are inherently 
unequal because separation is now voluntary instead of state 
sanctioned, equality now encompasses both resource equality and 
 
 1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  The separate but equal doctrine “apparently originated in Roberts v. 
City of Boston, 1850 . . . upholding school segregation against attack as being violative of a state 
constitutional guarantee of equality.”  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 n.6 (1954).  The 
Supreme Court expressly endorsed the “separate but equal” doctrine in the education context in 
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85–86 (1927) (finding that a Chinese citizen is not denied equal 
protection of the laws when he is “classed among the colored races and furnished facilities for 
education equal to that offered to all . . .”). 
 2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. Gary Orfield, quoted in Tresa Baldas, Saying Goodbye to Desegregation Plans, NAT’L L.J., 
June 16, 2003, at 4.  See also Gary Orfield, Why Segregation is Inherently Unequal: The 
Abandonment of Brown and the Continuing Failure of Plessey, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1041, 1042 
(2005) [hereinafter Inherently Unequal]. 
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educational outcome equality, and the liberty resulting from school 
choice is accepted as a remedy for inequity.  But these distinctions 
between the modern era’s and Plessey’s “separate but equal” 
paradigms make no educational difference for low income and 
minority students and our schools are, and will continue to be, 
separate and unequal. 
The push begun in Brown for integration lacks momentum 
among academics, all branches of government, and most 
importantly, society.  The racial and socioeconomic composition of a 
classroom no longer matters to parents selecting schools.  
Considering the collective disregard for integration, it is not 
surprising that schools are rapidly resegregating with no signs of 
slowing.  The accountability, finance reform, and school choice 
movements contribute to the extreme racial and socioeconomic 
segregation in today’s schools.  These movements replaced 
integration as the best means to attain equality in the 1990s and the 
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB”)4 may mark the point of 
no return down the modified “separate but equal” path to equality.  
The Act’s accountability methods and its resurrection of the 
segregationists’ favorite tool—school choice—lead to “perverse 
incentives” for schools to segregate.5  The current reform movements 
displace integration in the American conscience as the best route to 
equality by creating a false belief that minority achievement gaps can 
be eliminated in separate schools.6  They also degrade the socializing 
 
 4. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 20 
of the United States Code). 
 5. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
932 (2004) [hereinafter Perverse Incentives]. 
 6. Erica Frankenberg et al., The Civil Rights Project, Harvard University, A Multicultural 
Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? 10, at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf. (2003). 
01__GARDA.DOC 11/1/2007  3:48:37 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 5 ? 
component of education by judging schools exclusively on financial 
inputs or academic achievement measured by standardized test 
scores, thus making integration even less necessary.  In short, the 
current reform movements—financial adequacy claims, school 
choice, and accountability—make voluntary, or de facto, segregation 
morally and socially acceptable.  The Supreme Court apparently 
stands alone in its belief that classroom diversity provides significant 
educational benefits, yet it no longer compels schools to diversify 
their student bodies to achieve racial balance.7  The separate schools 
of today and tomorrow no longer need a “but equal” justification; 
they are separate without excuse: they are separate and equal. 
The promise of equal educational resources and outcomes and 
the liberty inherent in freedom of choice appears to make 
desegregation worth sacrificing, but true equality cannot be achieved 
without socioeconomic and racial integration.  Even a separate but 
perfectly equal education system, which will not unfold, is not as sure 
a route to equality and racial accord as integration.  The racially 
segregated schools of the future will inevitably be unequal.  The input 
equalization sought through finance litigation and the output 
equalization sought through the standards based accountability 
movement will prove as illusory as Plessey’s guarantee of equality.  
The standards based accountability of the NCLB Act will ensure that 
no child is left behind by lowering academic standards rather than 
improving the performance of its worst students—the poor and 
minorities—to the level of its best students.  Voucher programs and 
charter schools provide more hope for improved educational 
opportunities, though they have yet to live up to their promise and 
tend to further isolate poor and minority students.  The segregated 
 
 7. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–33 (2003). 
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schools of the future may be open to enrollment by any student, may 
attain equal resources and their students may all pass the same 
standardized tests, but the education received will by no means be 
equal. 
In Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice O’Connor predicted that race-
based admissions policies to higher education would be unnecessary 
in twenty-five years, because the achievement gap between 
nonwhites and whites would close.8  The opposite is likely to occur as 
education reform is leading us directly to a destination that the 
architects of Brown fought to avoid: racially segregated schools, 
which are inherently unequal.  Part I of this paper discusses Brown, 
its various interpretations, and the goals that its advocates hoped to 
achieve.  Part II explores the evolution of education reform law since 
Brown, tracking the ascent and fall of desegregation and the 
alternative legal avenues that opened for minorities to attain equality 
in education.  The rise of the finance reform, accountability, and 
freedom of choice movements are chronicled, ending with the NCLB.  
Part III describes the current state of American education, the 
benefits of integration to both minorities and society, and why 
desegregation was abandoned before it could achieve these benefits.  
Part IV discusses the possible futures of each of the reform 
movements and what will be lost in our impending separate and 
unequal schools. 
II 
THE UNDERPINNINGS OF BROWN 
For centuries prior to Brown v. Board of Education, American 
society and institutions were divided by race.  The governmental 
 
 8. Id. at 343. 
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structure was designed to prevent contact between the races and our 
institutions; beliefs and practices perpetuated racial separation and 
unequal treatment.  Educational institutions were no exception.  In 
the Jim Crow era, schools for minorities were separate from white 
schools—in the South, due to state sponsored, or de jure, segregation, 
and in the North and West due to residential patterns—and unequal 
in terms of resources, facilities, and staffing.9 
The brilliant advocates behind the fight for Brown—Marshall, 
Houston, White, and Margold—sought to end the “separate but 
equal” doctrine and not merely equalize separate schools.10  They 
rejected pursuing resource equalization for two reasons.  First, they 
accepted that, so long as black schools and white schools co-existed, 
white schools would be favored.11  Separate schools were an 
insurmountable barrier to true, equal educational opportunity.  They 
recognized the need to tie the educational fates of blacks to whites, 
because “green follows white,” i.e. white schools get better teachers, 
resources, facilities, and higher standards.12  Second, and more 
importantly, they believed in the intrinsic values and benefits of 
integration.  They viewed education as inherently intertwined with 
society and hoped to engineer a society that learned and worked 
together, not one that co-existed in parallel worlds.13 
 
 9. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION 13–22 (2004). 
 10. Dennis W. Archer, Overcoming All Obstacles: The Lawyers in Brown v. Board, in BROWN 
at 50: THE UNFINISHED LEGACY 7 (Deborah L. Rhode & Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. eds., 2004).  See 
also Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the 
Interest Convergence Dilemma, in BROWN at 50, supra, at 82. 
 11. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF 
CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 113–14 (2004). 
 12. James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L.REV. 432, 
477–78 (1999) [hereinafter The Influence of Race]. 
 13. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 
1925–1950, at xi (1987); Robert L. Carter, Reexamining Brown Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking 
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To achieve the integration ideal, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) laid the groundwork by 
fighting for integration in “separate but equal” graduate programs.  
In Sweatt v. Painter14 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,15 the 
Supreme Court held that separate graduate schools that were 
objectively equal—i.e. equal in terms of facilities and resources—
were not in fact equal.  These holdings opened the door for the 
“separate but equal” paradigm to be overturned in primary and 
secondary public education. 
In 1954, the Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education 
that separate but equal educational facilities deprived minority 
children equal educational opportunities guaranteed by the Equal 
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16  Relying on 
Sweatt and McLaurin, the Court reasoned that separate institutions 
are unequal for “intangible considerations” that are “incapable of 
objective measurement.”17  It found that such considerations “apply 
with added force” in grade schools and high schools because 
“[s]egregation with the sanction of law [denotes the inferiority of 
minority children and], therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the 
educational and mental development of Negro children and to 
deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] 
 
Backward into the Future, 14 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 615, 617 (1979); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE 
JUSTICE 543–81 (1977). 
 14. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (mandating integration of University of Texas law school even 
though a separate law school for blacks in Texas existed). 
 15. 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that Oklahoma’s disparate treatment of African Americans 
in graduate programs denied equal protection of the laws). 
 16. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 17. Id. 
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integrated school system.”18  For these reasons the Court held that 
“separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”19 
The intentionally brief and ambiguous reasoning of Brown—
necessitated by the Justices’ desire for a unanimous decision on an 
explosive issue—subjects the decision to two different 
interpretations.  It can be read broadly to mean that separate schools 
are inherently unequal because of “intangible considerations.” 
Therefore any segregation, whether state sponsored or not, is 
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court’s reliance on 
Sweatt and McLaurin—finding graduate programs with equal inputs 
to still be unequal—supports this interpretation.  Brown can also be 
read more narrowly to prohibit only state sponsored segregation.  
Because the only educational harm identified by the Court—feelings 
of racial inferiority—derives exclusively from de jure segregation, 
Brown can mean that de facto segregation requires no remedy.  These 
competing interpretations each found traction in the courts and the 
public conscience, which is discussed next. 
III 
THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION LAW SINCE BROWN 
Brown was hailed as a landmark victory that would forever 
change the face of race relations, discrimination, and education.  It 
achieved much of what its architects hoped, eliminating de jure 
segregation and engineering society by increasing contact among the 
races within schools.  Yet Brown did not entrench the education 
system in the desegregation path as initially hoped.  Instead, 
 
 18. Id. at 494.  The Court cited numerous social science studies that found that state 
sponsored segregation caused significant harms to blacks even if their schools were equal, because 
it resulted in low self-esteem and a defeatist attitude among black students, and it perpetuated 
odious stereotypes.  Id. at 494 n.11. 
 19. Id. at 495. 
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integration proved a mere detour from the resource equalization 
path of Plessey, altering the path to include educational outcome 
equality and liberty.  By looking at the effects of Brown and the legal 
reform movements in its wake, it is apparent that education today 
seeks to achieve equality for minorities through minimum 
educational standards, equivalent financing and school choice 
without regard to integration. 
A. 1954–1973: The Desegregation Movement 
In Brown v. Board of Education II, decided one year after Brown I, 
the Supreme Court required schools to desegregate “with all 
deliberate speed” and encouraged “prompt and full compliance” with 
Brown I.20  This mandate was met with “massive resistance.”21  The 
South initially rejected desegregation outright, denouncing Brown in 
the “Southern Manifesto” and interpreting it to forbid state 
sponsored segregation but not require integration.22  Between 1954 
and 1964 there was little change in policies affecting interracial 
contact in schools apart from the technical elimination of de jure 
regimes and “virtually nothing happened” to desegregate schools in 
the South.23  Segregationists fought both the letter and intent of 
 
 20. 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). 
 21. Judith A Hagley, Massive Resistance: The Rhetoric and Reality, 27 N.M. L. REV. 167 
(1997). 
 22. See, e.g., Holland v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 258 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1958) (“[T]he 
Fourteenth Amendment does not speak in positive terms to command integration, but negatively, 
to prohibit governmentally enforced segregation.”); Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 778 
(E.D.S.C. 1955).  See also OGLETREE, supra note 11, at 125. 
 23. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 52 (1991).  See also Dennis D. Parker, Are Reports of Brown’s Demise Exaggerated? 
Perspectives of a School Desegregation Litigator, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (2005); Orfield, 
Inherently Unequal, supra note 3; Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: 
Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1337 (2004); Nick Lewin, The 
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: The Triumph of School Choice Over Racial Desegregation, 12 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95, 107–08 (2005). 
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Brown by inventing educational schemes to ensure the continued 
separation of the races. 
The provision of school vouchers was a favorite tool of 
segregationists in this era.24  A voucher is a payment the government 
makes to a parent, or to an institution on a parent’s behalf, to be used 
for a child’s educational expense.25  Vouchers assist parents in 
sending their children to private schools, or public schools other than 
the neighborhood school, with tuition assistance from the 
government.  Though vouchers were conceived by Milton Friedman 
in the 1950s as a free-market means to improve public schools 
through competition, they were implemented after Brown primarily 
to avoid integration.26  For example, in 1959, Prince Edward County, 
Virginia, closed its public schools, and its residents created private 
schools for white students only, which were financially supported by 
state- and locally-funded tuition grants and tax credits.27  The 
Supreme Court held in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince 
Edward County that these practices violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because “the result is that 
Prince Edward County school children, if they go to school in their 
 
 24. Clint Alexander & Kern Alexander, Vouchers and the Privatization of American 
Education: Justifying Racial Resegregation from Brown to Zelman, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1137–
41. 
 25. Id. at 1132. 
 26. Id. at 1137–38.  See also id. at 1133 (a “veiled crusade was launched under the pretext of 
private choice to resegregate the nation’s schools through the use of tuition vouchers . . . .”); James 
Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives Got There First, 93 GEO. L.J. 
1287, 1288 (2005) (explaining that school choice was used in the south to avoid Brown, but that 
civil rights advocates in the North supported vouchers for minority students to escape poorly 
performing schools); Terry M. Moe, The Future of School Vouchers, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL 
CHOICE 147 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 2003); THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL CHOICE ix (Paul E. Peterson 
ed.) (2003) (the freedom of the school choice movement started with Milton Friedman); MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EDUCATION, IN ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 127 (Robert A. Solow ed., 1955). 
 27. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 221–23 (1964). 
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own county, must go to racially segregated schools which, although 
designated as private, are beneficiaries of county and state support.”28  
The Court broadly interpreted Brown to prohibit segregation caused 
by private choice aided by public monies. 
The Griffin ruling combined with the legislative and executive 
branches of the federal government placing their full weight behind 
desegregation changed the legal landscape in 1964.  The passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 combined with the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”) provided the necessary carrot 
(significant federal funds) and stick (withholding of funds if schools 
failed to desegregate) to bring about meaningful change.29  Faced 
with foregoing significant federal funds, schools began to grudgingly 
integrate. 
In the South, “freedom-of-choice” plans were implemented to 
prevent integration while maintaining eligibility for federal ESEA 
funds.30  In New Kent County, Virginia, for example, residents were 
permitted to choose between two public schools, one white and the 
 
 28. Id. at 230–31.  See also Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 368 U.S. 515 (1962) 
(invalidating a Louisiana statute that provided a means for public schools to become private 
schools as a denial of equal protection, because the legislation was created to accomplish the 
perpetuation of racial segregation by closing public schools and operating only segregated schools 
supported directly or indirectly by state or county funds).  Numerous district courts also held 
tuition assistance statutes unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm’n., 296 F. 
Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss 1969); Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969); 
Brown v. S.C. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C.), aff’d per curiam, 393 U.S. 222 (1968); 
Poindexter v. La. Fin. Assistance Comm’n., 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), aff’d, 389 U.S. 571 
(1968); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967). 
 29. GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND 
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 46, 77 (1969). 
 30. AMY STUART WELLS, TIME TO CHOOSE: AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS OF SCHOOL 
CHOICE POLICY 62 (1993); Betsy Levin, Race and School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL 
CONTROVERSY 266–68 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999) (school choice 
flourished during this time as means to avoid desegregation); Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the 
Transition, School Choice and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728 (1986). 
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other black.31  No white children chose to attend the black school, 
and eight-five percent of the black students remained at the black 
school.32  The Supreme Court struck down the plan in Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia, because 
“‘freedom of choice’ . . . is only a means to a constitutionally required 
end—the abolition of the system of segregation and its effects.  If the 
means . . . fail[] to undo segregation, other means must be used to 
achieve this end.”33  The Court established an “affirmative duty to 
take whatever steps may be necessary to convert to a unitary system 
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 
branch.”34  By focusing on the racial composition of the schools 
resulting from a neutral choice policy, the Green Court interpreted 
Brown to eliminate the de jure “root” of segregation and its resulting 
de facto segregation “branch.” 
The Supreme Court continued its vigorous pursuit of racial 
balancing in schools in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, by authorizing cross-town bussing and altering school 
attendance zones, because “[t]he objective today remains to eliminate 
from the public schools all vestiges of state imposed segregation.”35  
The Court emphasized that “school authorities should make every 
effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual     
desegregation . . . .”36  Residential segregation within a district no 
 
 31. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430, 431–32 (1968). 
 32. Id. at 441. 
 33. Id. at 440. 
 34. Id. at 437–38.  See also Lewin, supra note 23, at 109–11 (The U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights and the courts quickly recognized the segregative impact of freedom of choice plans and 
they were treated with suspicion, or banned outright, in many desegregation orders). 
 35. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). 
 36. Id. at 26. 
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longer excused districts that practiced invidious discrimination from 
racially balancing their schools through student assignment policies. 
By 1971, it was clear that private choice resulting in segregated 
schools—whether through vouchers, public school choice, or 
residential choice within a district—was constitutionally infirm.  The 
Equal Protection Clause presented a barrier to neutral voucher and 
freedom of choice plans that yielded segregated schools.37  Racial 
separation, whether state sponsored or voluntary, was unacceptable 
and “the Supreme Court made racial balance the sin qua non of 
successful compliance with Brown.”38  Student assignment policies 
designed to racially balance schools were the most important 
remedial measures for courts to consider when deciding the unitary 
status of a district.39  Because all governmental branches worked 
together to achieve racially blended schools, integration peaked in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s and there was a dramatic increase in 
the level of interracial contact within schools.40 
 
 37. See also Norwood v. D.L. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467 (1973) (striking a Mississippi plan 
that purchased school books and gave them to students at private segregated schools, because a 
state cannot provide aide to institutions that practice invidious discrimination).  Norwood implied 
that the use of tuition vouchers violated the Equal Protection clause if they had tendency to 
reinforce and support private discrimination.  Alexander & Alexander, supra note 24, at 1144. 
 38. Rachel F. Moran, Brown’s Legacy: The Evolution of Educational Equity, 66 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 155, 159 (2004).  See also Dan J. Nichols, Brown v. Board of Education and the No Child Left 
Behind Act: Competing Ideologies, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. L.J. 151, 168 (2005). 
 39. Green, 391 U.S. at 435; Swann, 402 U.S. at 28; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 202–03.  See also United 
States Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, GENERAL STATEMENT 
OF POLICIES UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 RESPECTING DESEGREGATION OF 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1965). 
 40. Clotfelter, supra note 9, at 26–27; Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 17. 
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B. 1973–1983: The Erosion of Integration and Resurrection of 
Resource Equality 
Despite the success in integrating schools, the government began 
“dismantling desegregation” in the 1970s.41  Richard Nixon 
campaigned against desegregation orders as part of his “Southern 
strategy” in the 1968 presidential election and, once elected, he 
attempted to end enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in 
schools.42  President Nixon set the tone for the next two decades of 
education reform by declaring that he would prohibit bussing to 
achieve racial balance in schools and instead direct additional funds 
to poor and inner city schools.43  Nixon’s separate but equal message 
was adopted by Congress—primarily because of the stiff opposition 
to bussing from the politically powerful middle-class suburbs—and 
legislation began concentrating on increasing funding to urban 
school districts rather than integration.44  Racially separate schools 
would be acceptable if they were meaningfully equal. 
The Supreme Court, reshaped by Nixon appointees, also 
retreated from integration.  In 1973, the Supreme Court pushed the 
integration tide to its legal high-water mark while at the same time 
laying the groundwork for its eventual ebb.  In Keyes v. Denver School 
District No. 1, the Court held that de facto segregation in a majority 
of the Denver school system could be remedied by the courts because 
 
 41. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, THE QUIET 
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1 (1996). 
 42. Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 8. 
 43. Transcript of Nixon’s Statement on School Busing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1972, at 22 (“It is 
time for us to make a national commitment to see that the schools in the central cities are 
upgraded so that the children who go there will have just as good a chance to get quality 
education as do the children who go to school in the suburbs.”). 
 44. James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 
2043, 2055 (2001–2002).  See also id. at 8, 14, 67 (Congress drastically cut back on desegregation 
enforcement and 1972 saw the last legislation supporting integration). 
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of de jure segregation in limited areas of the school district.45  By 
finding that desegregation orders could reach voluntary segregation 
caused by residential patterns, even in limited circumstances, the 
Court extended desegregation efforts to the North and West which 
had significant racial isolation but no statutorily mandated dual 
school systems.  But by refusing to eliminate the legal distinction 
between de facto and de jure segregation, and remedying the latter 
only if it was the result of invidious discrimination, the Court began 
the narrowing of Brown.  Schools segregated by private choice, not 
influenced by state sponsored discrimination, were now beyond the 
reach of the courts. 
The Supreme Court’s shift away from racial balancing became 
complete in 1974, as it started interpreting Brown as merely “a 
formalistic rule of non-discrimination.”46  The critical blow came in 
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), in which the Supreme Court 
prohibited interdistrict, or between district, bussing to achieve 
integration in urban Detroit schools.47  Building on Keyes, the Court 
held that the affirmative duty to integrate extended only to school 
districts that had shown clear de jure discrimination in the past.48  
Because the suburban Detroit schools did not have a history of state 
sponsored discrimination, their students could not be used to 
remedy the invidious discrimination in the urban Detroit schools.  
 
 45. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
 46. Moran, supra note 38, at 161. 
 47. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).  See Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of the Law, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2430–31 (2004) (“the Milliken decision effectively brought [desegregation] to 
a close.”) [hereinafter Litigated Learning]; Mark C. Rahdert, Obstacles and Wrong Turns on the 
Road from Brown: Milliken v. Bradley and the Quest for Racial Diversity in Education, 13 TEMPLE 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 785, 786 (Spring 2004) (“If there is one single case that marks the point 
where the Court started to abandon its quest to integrate American public education, in my view 
that case is Milliken v. Bradley.”). 
 48. 418 U.S. at 745. 
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Whereas Swann remediated intradistrict residential choice yielding 
racially isolated schools, Milliken I insulated interdistrict residential 
choice despite its segregative impact, thus rendering Brown obsolete 
in fighting interdistrict residential segregation. 
The impact of Milliken I on integration was devastating.  By 1974, 
the earnest enforcement of Brown led directly to “white flight” from 
urban school districts to the suburbs and private schools.49  Urban 
school districts had become minority hubs that could not racially 
balance their schools without drawing from the white suburban 
spokes.  Milliken I ensured separate schools for urban blacks and 
suburban whites by limiting the interracial composition of schools to 
the racial composition of the school district.  As Justice Marshall 
predicted in his dissent, Milliken I ensured the continual separation 
of races for years to come.50 
Just as dramatic was Milliken I’s long-term influence on society’s 
view of segregated schools.  The Griffin and Green decisions holding 
that private choice resulting in segregated schools was 
constitutionally infirm led to an underlying view that separation of 
any type was socially and morally unacceptable.  Racial isolation, 
whether state sponsored or not, was improper.  Milliken I drove a 
 
 49. John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”? Racial Resegregation, High Stakes 
Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1375, 1392 
(2002–2003) (desegregation led whites to enroll children at predominantly white private schools); 
Clotfelter, supra note 9, at 8, 82–83, 109–110, 113–14, 121 (desegregation led directly to white 
flight from urban schools); Alison Barnes, The Conundrum of Segregation’s Ending: The Education 
Choices, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 33, 35 (2005) (whites fled urban centers for many reasons, including 
better jobs, safer communities, and the advent of improved transportation, but desegregation also 
led directly to white loss apart from these other demographic factors).  But see James E. Ryan, 
Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 282 (1999–2000) (citing conflicting studies as to 
whether desegregation led to white flight). 
 50. 418 U.S. at 814–15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  See also Clotfelter, supra note 9, at 78–81 
(residential segregation increased in the 1970s following Milliken); Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate 
and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1461, 1470 (2002–2003) 
(Milliken I encouraged white flight). 
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wedge in this ethos by finding that one type of private choice that led 
to racial separation—the choice to live in a segregated school 
district—was constitutionally permissible.  Over time, the populace 
embraced this constitutional interpretation as a social and moral 
principle, making segregated schools tolerable so long as the 
segregation was not state sponsored.51 
While the three branches of government were dismantling 
desegregation, civil rights leaders began questioning the efficacy of 
integration as a means to improve minority educational opportunity.  
The integrative principles of Brown were viewed by civil rights 
leaders as based on the demeaning proposition that minorities could 
not learn unless seated next to whites.  Malcolm X forcefully argued 
that “what integrationists . . . are saying, when they say that whites 
and blacks must go to school together, is that the whites are so much 
superior that just their presence in the black classroom balances it 
out.  I can’t go along with that.”52  This view of integration, combined 
with the white hostility to integration, led minorities to believe that 
their best route to equality was to improve their own schools.53  The 
Milliken I defeat further pushed minorities to seek alternatives to 
integration. 
The government’s retreat from integration mixed with the 
perception that integration was not helping minorities to the extent 
initially envisioned, led to the birth of the school finance reform 
 
 51. Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community (A 
Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353, 1399–
1402 (2005).  See also id. at 1358 (“We have come to think of de facto segregation not simply as 
the absence of judicially cognizable constitutional injury, but as the absence of any injury at all.”). 
 52. MALCOM X: BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS AND A LETTER 16–17 
(George Breitman ed., 1970), cited in Forman, supra note 26, at 1307. 
 53. Id. at 1306. 
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movement in the early 1970s.54  School finance litigation challenged 
state school finance schemes that inequitably funded school districts.  
Nearly all school finance systems employ a mixture of state and local 
revenue, with local governments providing the bulk of the funding 
through property and sales taxes.55  Inequalities are inherent in such 
a system due to disparate property wealth: wealthy school districts 
with high land value are well funded with a low tax rate while poor 
school districts with depressed land values are poorly funded despite 
high property tax rates.  Finance litigation sought to remove financial 
disparities by requiring all districts to be funded equally.  It initially 
complemented integration by ensuring that all integrated schools, 
whether in the suburbs or the cities, would be equitably funded thus 
leveling educational opportunities.  But over time, school finance 
reform undermined integration by creating the hope of meaningful 
equity in racially divided schools—that separate did not have to be 
inherently unequal. 
The first “wave” of finance litigation challenged state financing 
schemes based on the federal Equal Protection Clause.56  It began in 
1971 with the successful challenge to California’s financing scheme 
in Serrano v. Priest,57 and ended two years later with San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, where the Supreme Court 
 
 54. John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2358 (2004); James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 
74 N.Y.U L. REV. 529, 532 n.12 (1999) [hereinafter Sheff]; Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra 
note 49, at 259 (civil rights activists sought equal educational opportunity through finance 
litigation). 
 55. For a general discussion of school financing schemes, see Allen R. Odden, School Finance 
and Education Reform, in RETHINKING SCHOOL FINANCE 1 (Allen R. Odden ed., 1992). 
 56. William Thro’s “wave” metaphor is pervasive in discussions of education finance reform.  
William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on 
the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990). 
 57. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (striking down property based funding scheme on state and 
federal equal protection grounds because wealth is a suspect classification and education is a 
fundamental right). 
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declared that school funding inequities do not violate the United 
States Constitution.58  At the end of 1974, the hope for education 
reform in the courts was bleak, as the Supreme Court had denied 
both interdistrict bussing to achieve integration and a constitutional 
guarantee of equivalent financing for all schools.  The divide between 
middle-class, white, suburban schools and poor, urban, minority 
schools appeared unbreakable. 
But developments in the mid-1970s provided hope for at least 
closing the financial gap between suburban and urban schools.  The 
second wave of school finance litigation relied on state constitutional 
provisions.  Every state constitution contains some form of equal 
protection guarantee and an education clause mandating the 
provision of a free and public education.  The education clauses 
guarantee a certain level of education to state residents, such as an 
“adequate” or “thorough and efficient” or “general and uniform” 
education.59  Successful challenges to state finance systems during 
this second “wave” of finance litigation combined the state 
constitutional education clauses with the state equal protection 
clauses to seek equalized funding per pupil.60 
The fight for financial equity received a significant boost from the 
desegregation cases of 1977.  In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), the 
Supreme Court required states to fund remedial and compensatory 
 
 58. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 59. See generally DAVID C. THOMPSON ET AL., FISCAL LEADERSHIP FOR SCHOOLS: CONCEPTS 
AND PRACTICES 282–86 (1994) (cataloguing the education articles found in all fifty state 
constitutions); R. CRAIG WOOD & DAVID C THOMPSON, EDUCATION FINANCE LAW: 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE AIDE PLANS—AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES app. (2d ed. 
2006) (cataloguing provisions for equal treatment in forty-nine state constitutions). 
 60. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 
651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 
1980). 
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educational programs in segregated districts.61  Almost as a 
“consolation prize” to the defeat in Milliken I, which made 
desegregation virtually impossible, the Court ordered that extra 
money be provided to segregated schools to make up for past 
discrimination.62  The racially isolated schools created by Milliken I 
would at least be well-funded under Milliken II.  After Milliken II, 
courts increasingly ordered states and local school boards to infuse 
money into segregated schools, rather than order desegregation, to 
overcome the vestiges of prior discrimination.  Remedial funding 
soon began displacing integration as the primary focus of 
desegregation cases.63 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, minority leaders and academics 
further abandoned integration and firmly latched onto school 
finance reform as the best means to improve educational 
opportunities for minorities.  In 1980, Derrick Bell’s groundbreaking 
Interest-Convergence article argued that Brown mandated integration 
only because the interests of powerful whites converged with the 
interests of African Americans, and that integration harmed black 
students.64 Bell concluded that equal opportunity for disadvantaged 
students was best achieved by equal school financing.65  Three years 
later, the classic book, Strategies for Effective Desegregation, identified 
four widely held myths about desegregation: it increased racial 
separation through white flight; it lowered educational quality and 
increased racial prejudice by creating racial strife; it created discord 
 
 61. 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
 62. Rahdert, supra note 47, at 801. 
 63. McUsic, supra note 23, at 1343; Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 49, at 264. 
 64. Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 
93 HARV. L.REV. 518, 524–25, 531–32 (1980).  See also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE 
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990). 
 65. Bell, supra note 64, at 532–33. 
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in terms of race relations and support for community schools; and 
mandatory integration plans such as bussing were not necessary for 
desegregation.66  Despite the fact that “the new mythology [did] not 
jibe with available evidence from education and social science 
research,”67 desegregation was viewed as a failure.  Charles Clotfelter 
summarized the mood at the time: “Frustrated by white resistance to 
desegregation and disappointed by the perception that blacks had 
borne the bulk of desegregation’s costs—including longer bus rides, 
inferior teaching assignments, and the closing of black schools—
[black] leaders increasingly stressed school quality over 
desegregation.”68 
C. 1983–2000: The Accountability and School Choice Movements 
While the debate over desegregation, mandatory bussing, and 
adequate financing was grabbing both the headlines and the public 
conscience, a movement began in the 1980s which was concerned 
with the educational plight of all students, not just minorities.  In 
1983 the Department of Education published A Nation at Risk, which 
criticized public schools for setting their sights too low and pointed 
to a “rising tide of [educational] mediocrity that threatens our very 
future as a Nation and a people.”69  The report showed that American 
students ranked last in comparison to students in other 
industrialized countries in seven of nineteen achievement tests and 
that student achievement in the United States declined precipitously 
from 1963 to 1980.70  Not since the launching of Sputnik had the 
 
 66. WILLIS D. HAWLEY ET. AL., STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE DESEGREGATION 1–2 (1983). 
 67. Id. at 2. See also Ogletree, supra note 22, at 250, 302. 
 68. Clotfelter, supra note 9, at 184. 
 69. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A NATION AT RISK 5 
(1983). 
 70. Id. at 8–9. 
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education system come under such rigorous attack.  The report 
galvanized educators, activists, politicians, and business leaders to 
search for alternative education reforms that raised the level of 
education for all students.  The primary focus became subjecting 
schools that were immune from market forces to incentives to 
improve, either through competitive pressure or internal 
accountability.71 
By the end of 1984, the standards-based accountability reform 
movement was born, as school reformers began an ambitious agenda 
to raise educational standards nationwide.72  Standards-based 
accountability entails high educational goals for every student, 
carefully designed curricula to move students toward those goals, 
regular assessment of student progress through uniform tests to 
determine if goals are being achieved, and rewards or punishments 
for students, teachers, and administrators to create incentives for 
reaching the prescribed goals.  Within a few years after publication of 
A Nation at Risk, nearly all fifty states had adopted some form of 
minimum competency standards for students.73  In its infant years, 
the accountability movement focused almost exclusively on 
students—requiring them to pass “high stakes” tests to advance to 
the next grade or graduate—while schools themselves were not 
assessed or held accountable. 
 
 71. Aaron J. Saiger, Legislating Accountability: Standards, Sanctions and School District 
Reform, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1655, 1673, 1706–07 (2005). 
 72. Boger, supra note 49, at 1425. 
 73. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The 
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 
208 (2003); Diane Ravitch, The Search for Order and the Rejection of Conformity: Standards in 
American Education, in LEARNING FROM THE PAST: WHAT HISTORY TEACHES US ABOUT SCHOOL 
REFORM 167, 179 (Diane Ravitch & Maris A. Vinovskis eds., 1995) (by the 1987–1988 school year, 
forty-five states and District of Columbia applied some form of statewide test, with twenty-five 
states using nationally normed exams). 
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A Nation at Risk also led reformers to resuscitate school choice.  
Public schools would improve, it was thought, if they had to compete 
for students (and the state funds that accompany them) with public 
charter schools and private schools through voucher programs.  The 
Court’s erosion of the Equal Protection barrier that previously 
hindered freedom of choice plans, combined with the social and 
political will generated by A Nation at Risk, raised school choice 
plans to the forefront of education reform. 
The influence of A Nation at Risk on the education reform 
movement cannot be understated.  It is considered by many 
observers as the primary impetus for the standards-based 
accountability and school choice movements, both radical departures 
from past reforms and both of which dominate education reform 
today.74  Its influence on society’s views of finance reform and 
integration—the primary reform tools of the time—was dramatic.  
As Gail Sunderman notes, “[A] Nation at Risk shifted the debate 
from a focus on educational access and equity to a concern with 
educational quality” 75 and also “promoted the application of market 
principles to education and school choice as remedies for educational 
problems.”76  The standards-based accountability movement 
redirected the nation’s focus from educational inputs—money, 
 
 74. Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, The Politics and Practice of Accountability, in NO 
CHILD LEFT BEHIND?  THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 6 (Paul E. 
Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003) [hereinafter NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?]; Andrew 
Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind: Forging a Congressional Compromise, in NO CHILD LEFT 
BEHIND? 23, 29; Suhrid S. Gajendragadkar, Note, The Constitutionality of Racial Balancing in 
Charter Schools, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 144, 148 (2006). 
 75. Gail L. Sunderman, The Civil Rights Project, Harvard University, The Unraveling of No 
Child Left Behind: How Negotiated Changes Transform the Law 14 (2006), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/esea/nclb_unraveling.php; see also Stephen A. 
Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New Idea, Getting Behind No Child Left 
Behind and Getting Outside of it All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 26 (2004); West & Peterson, 
supra note 74, at 16. 
 76. Sunderman, supra note 75, at n.6. 
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teachers, facilities, racial composition—to educational outputs, in the 
form of student academic achievement as measured by standardized 
test scores. 
Civil rights activists and minority leaders latched on to the 
accountability movement as a tool to promote equity in public 
education.77  Standards-based reform promoted both excellence and 
equity by requiring all students, not just privileged whites, to meet 
the same high standards.  More importantly, standards based reform 
appeared to be the only means to help minority students, because 
integration was further dismantled—the Reagan administration took 
a strong stance against desegregation and sought an end to 
desegregation orders78—and finance equity litigation began to fizzle. 
The equity challenges to state financing schemes enjoyed only 
moderate success in the 1980s.  State courts began applying a rational 
basis standard to plaintiffs’ equal protection claims, often finding 
that the state’s interest in promoting local control was a sufficient 
interest to justify funding disparities.79  As of 1988, finance equity 
lawsuits had succeeded in only seven states and failed in fifteen.80  
Strict financial equality between school districts required that either 
the highest spending districts cap their spending or that the state 
 
 77. Boger, supra note 49, at 1426; William L. Taylor, Assessment as a Means to a Quality 
Education, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 311, 312–13 (2001); West & Peterson, supra note 74, 
at 6–7 (the promise of accountability to improve all schools through higher educational standards 
appeased both middle-class whites and poor minorities).  In 1987 the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund recognized that the standards movement created “an affirmative opportunity to define a 
right to a minimally adequate education.”  Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for All: A Right, 
An Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55, 61 (1987). 
 78. Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 18. 
 79. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 364–65 (N.Y. 1982); Hornbeck v. 
Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 790 (Md. 1983); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. 
v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1146–47 (Okla. 1987); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 
(S.C. 1988); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579–80 (Wisc. 1989). 
 80. Michael A. Rebell, Adequacy Litigation: A New Path to Equity, 141 PLI/NY 211, 221 
(2004). 
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recapture wealthy district tax money and redistribute it to poorer 
districts.  Neither of these options was palatable to the politically 
powerful suburban majority who wanted to maintain excellent 
schools, and the resulting high property values, through disparately 
high spending.81  Suburban resistance to finance reform resulted in 
few court victories for reformers and spotty implementation of court 
orders by state legislatures.82  Education reform was poised for radical 
change on several fronts, which occurred in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. 
First, school finance litigation evolved into its third wave, 
influenced heavily by standards-based accountability.83  The 
underlying claim in the third wave of finance litigation was not that 
all school districts are entitled to strict funding equality, but rather 
that all students are entitled to funding sufficient to provide them 
with the “adequate” or “efficient” education guaranteed under the 
state constitution.84  Finance adequacy litigation did not risk 
decreasing expenditures at high performing middle-class schools—
the primary roadblock thwarting finance equity lawsuits—because 
wealthier districts could exceed the expenditures necessary to 
 
 81. McUsic, supra note 23, at 1348–49 (2004); Saiger, supra note 71, at 1693–94 (wealthy 
districts oppose finance reform); Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2058–63 (explaining how 
suburban resistance blunted the effect of finance reform). 
 82. Saiger, supra note 71; Dayton & Dupre, supra note 54. 
 83. James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School Finance 
Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 473 (2004) 
(adequacy lawsuits arose at same time that standard based reforms were gaining momentum); 
Dayton & Dupre, supra note 54, at 2391–92 (explaining that the goal of finance litigation moved 
from equal finances to sufficient finances to produce an “adequate” education).  Adequacy 
litigation did not displace equity litigation, as many school finance plaintiffs continue to claim 
that finance schemes violate state equal protection clauses.  Id. at 2351, 2382, 2389 n.219. 
 84. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206, 213 (Ky. 1989); Helena 
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 689–90 (Mont. 1989); Abbot v. Burke, 575 A.2d 
359, 363 (N.J. 1990) (funding of poor urban schools must be adequate to address their special 
disadvantages). 
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produce an “adequate” education.  In short, adequacy suits presented 
more “modest and achievable goals” than equity lawsuits.85  Not 
surprisingly, plaintiffs were more successful in adequacy lawsuits 
than in equity lawsuits, prevailing in eighteen of the twenty-nine 
major decisions of the states’ highest courts since 1989.86 
The rise of finance adequacy reform coincided with the final nails 
being driven into the coffin of desegregation.  In 1991, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell that 
once unitary status is achieved in a school district a desegregation 
order should end even if it will inevitably result in the resegregation 
of the schools.87  The Court went one step further in 1992, when it 
ruled in Freeman v. Pitts that school districts were no longer 
obligated to undo intradistrict de facto segregation resulting from 
residential patterns, despite a history of invidious discrimination in 
the district.88  Finally, in 1995 the Supreme Court decided Missouri v. 
Jenkins, wherein it struck down a desegregation order that required 
Kansas City to use state money to create magnet schools in the hopes 
of luring suburban whites back into the urban school district.89  In 
Jenkins, the Court held that achievement disparities between whites 
and nonwhites did not prevent a finding of unitary status, because 
the ultimate inquiry for finding unitary status was whether the 
district complied in good faith with the desegregation decree and 
 
 85. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 101, 182 (1995). 
 86. Rebell, supra note 80, at 216–17, 221–22 (sixteen of the eighteen victories involved 
substantial or partial adequacy considerations).  See also Dayton & Dupre, supra note 54, at 2351, 
2382, 2389 n.219. 
 87. 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991). 
 88. 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992).  The plaintiff was now required to prove that the segregated 
schools were a vestige of a dual school system and not merely the product of demographic forces. 
Id. at 495–96. 
 89. 515 U.S. 70, 100–01 (1995). 
01__GARDA.DOC 11/1/2007  3:48:37 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 28 ? 
whether vestiges of past discrimination were eliminated to the extent 
practicable.  In other words, districts fulfilled their obligation under 
Brown, despite having segregated schools with unequal resources, so 
long as they had made a good faith effort to integrate.  As a result, 
desegregation orders were rapidly ended through declarations that 
schools were achieving unitary status or were being entirely 
ignored.90  The Dowell, Pitts, and Jenkins decisions further 
entrenched the social acceptability of racially divided schools in the 
public conscience: resegregated and unequal schools which were not 
the direct result of invidious discrimination were acceptable—only 
state sponsored segregation was a social malady worth remedying. 
Because Dowell, Pitts, and Jenkins relaxed the standards for 
finding unitary status, the emphasis of desegregation cases 
necessarily became paying reparations for segregation instead of 
ensuring racially balanced schools.  Unitary status was often achieved 
in the 1990s through one-time payments from the state to school 
districts in settlement of desegregation cases.91  By the end of the 
1990s, desegregation cases completed their merge with finance 
litigation, as they both resulted in more funding for minority schools, 
but not integration. 
By finding that the Fourteenth Amendment no longer 
circumscribed the private choices that resulted in segregation, the 
Supreme Court opened the door for the third important 
development during this time period—the implementation of 
freedom of choice plans through voucher programs and charter 
schools.  While revival of the school choice movement in the 1990s 
 
 90. Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudence of Choice and Diversity in Race 
and Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 455, 465 (2005); Ogletree, supra note 22, at 71, 
260; Clotfelter, supra note 9, at 4. 
 91. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 49, at 260, 271. 
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was not a surprise, the source was: poor urban African Americans.92  
In Milwaukee the urban poor were fed up with the ineffectiveness of 
desegregation and teamed with the traditional conservative 
supporters of vouchers to create the nation’s first pilot voucher 
program in 1992.93  African American leaders pushed for vouchers 
despite their racist pedigree because it was their children’s only 
escape from dysfunctional schools.  By leading the charge, 
Milwaukee’s African Americans transformed vouchers from a free 
market issue to a social equity issue.  Vouchers moved in three short 
decades from being a civil rights anathema to a method preferable 
over integration to assist minorities in achieving equal educational 
opportunity.94  Despite the perceived advantages of voucher 
programs, they experienced limited growth in the 1990s in part 
because of fears that the provision of state funded vouchers for use at 
sectarian schools violated the Establishment Clause.95 
Charter schools also began their rapid ascent in the early 1990s.  
Minnesota passed the first state law authorizing the creation of 
charter schools and the nation’s first charter school opened in 1992.96  
 
 92. Ronald Reagan had pushed throughout the 1980s to allow students to use Title I funds as 
they saw fit, but the choice movement did not gain traction until the 1990s.  Rudalevige, supra 
note 74, at 30–31.  The push for vouchers from civil rights groups may not be as surprising as it 
appears, considering that many civil rights activists in the North pursued vouchers and freedom 
of choice plans in the 1960s in order for minority students to escape poor schools.  For a 
discussion of the political history of school choice, see Forman, supra note 26; Goodwin Liu & 
William Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 812–13 (2005). 
 93. Moe, supra note 26, at 148. 
 94. Id.; see also Paul E. Peterson, Introduction: After Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, What Next?, 
in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL CHOICE,  supra note 26, at 2, 6, 7, 10. 
 95. Clint Bolick, Sunshine Replaces the Cloud, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra 
note 26, at 57 (the school choice movement was initially dogged by the Equal Protection clause 
and later by the Establishment Clause).  Indeed, every freedom of choice plan until 2002 was met 
with legal challenges contesting their constitutionality, pressed mainly by teachers’ unions.  Id.; 
Peter Berkowitz, Liberalism and School Choice, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 
26, at 108. 
 96. Peterson, supra note 94, at 10. 
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Charter schools are self-governing public schools, often run by 
private companies, which operate outside the authority of the local 
school boards and enjoy greater flexibility than traditional public 
schools in the areas of policy, curriculum, hiring, and teaching 
techniques.  They operate under a charter, or contract, with the state 
or its subdivision, and are publicly funded, tuition-free, nonsectarian 
schools.97  Charter schools are popular because they provide 
competition to traditional public schools, creating incentives to 
improve, but they remain public schools, subject to state 
accountability measures and limited control.  Charter schools 
flourished in the 1990s society that highly valued public schooling, 
accountability, and notions of free choice.98  The federal government 
legitimized the charter school movement in 1995 by allocating six 
million dollars in start-up capital to charter schools and funding 
charter school studies and conferences in the Public Charter School 
Program.99 
The final major development to occur in the 1990s was the rapid 
growth of the accountability movement.  Due to broad-based support 
from whites, minorities, the middle class, and the poor, 
comprehensive accountability models began to emerge in many 
states such as Texas.100  The federal government also increasingly 
 
 97. See generally Brunno V. Manno et al., Beyond the Schoolhouse Door: How Charter Schools 
are Transforming U.S. Public Education, 81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 736 (2000) (explaining structure 
of charter schools). 
 98. Tom Loveless, Charter School Achievement and Accountability, in NO CHILD LEFT 
BEHIND?, supra note 74, at 177; Steven K. Green, Seminal or Symbolic?, in THE FUTURE OF 
SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 26, at 54. 
 99. This Act was part of the Improving America's Schools Act, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 
3518 (1994) (originally codified at 20 U.S.C. § 8061 (1994) (repealed in 2002)).  For a discussion 
of federal involvement in the charter school movement in the 1990s, see Gajendragadkar, supra 
note 74, at 149. 
 100. Frederick M. Hess, Refining or Retreating?  High Stakes Accountability in the States, in 
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 74, at 55. 
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threw its weight behind accountability reforms leading to 
unprecedented growth.101  In 1996 only ten states had active 
accountability systems, but by 2000 that figure had increased to 
thirty-seven.102  Accountability regimes also began to hold schools, as 
well as students, accountable for student achievement. 
Finally, in 2002, the Supreme Court eliminated the Establishment 
Clause barrier to vouchers by upholding Cleveland’s voucher 
program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.103  Zelman completed the 
transformation of vouchers from segregationists’ tool to a civil rights 
initiative to assist poor and minority students.  President Bush and 
his cabinet proclaimed Zelman a historic civil rights victory second 
only to Brown because it endorsed voucher programs for inner city 
children to escape poor and underperforming schools.104  While 
Brown opened school doors previously closed by race, it was 
expected that Zelman would open school doors previously closed by 
class.105 
 
 101. In 1991, President George H.W. Bush proclaimed “America 2000: An Educational 
Strategy” as his plan for attaining excellence in public schools, which reflected standards based 
reforms.  U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., AMERICA 2000: AN EDUCATION STRATEGY (1991).  In 1994, Title I 
was re-authorized as the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA) to include many accountability 
reforms. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(a)(1), 8062 (1994).  In the same year, President Clinton signed into 
law the “Goals 2000: Educate America Act,” a three hundred and ninety-four million dollar 
comprehensive education reform bill which created financial incentives for states to develop 
standards and assessment procedures.  Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 102. Jennifer Hochschild, Rethinking Accountability Politics, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, 
supra note 74, at 108 (citing Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, Improving Educational 
Quality: How Best to Evaluate Our Schools? (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2002), available at 
http://edpro.stanford.edu/eah/papers/accountability.BostonFedfinal%20publication.pdf).  See also 
id. at 109 (many states adopted high stakes accountability measures in the mid- to late 1990s and 
state takeover provisions of failing schools expanded, states actually took over schools more often, 
and many states created mechanisms for creating charter schools to replace failing schools); Moe, 
supra note 26, at 80 (the accountability movement exploded in the late 1990s). 
 103. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 104. Forman, supra note 26, at 1314–15.  See also Peterson, supra note 94, at 1 (President Bush 
declared that Zelman represents a turning point in how Americans think about education). 
 105. Peterson, supra note 94, at 2; Bolick, supra note 95, at 55. 
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By the end of the century, school finance reform, accountability, 
and freedom of choice completely displaced desegregation as the 
primary means to achieve equal educational opportunity for 
minorities.  Desegregation cases were being resolved as though they 
were finance cases, and finance cases began pursuing the modest goal 
of obtaining financing sufficient for an adequate education.  With 
desegregation no longer a primary or even secondary goal, and with 
equal funding claims transforming into funding adequacy claims, the 
stage was set for the accountability and freedom of choice 
movements to predominate educational reform efforts. 
D. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB”)106 is the most 
important piece of education legislation in the last thirty-five years.  
The NCLB’s express goals are to boost academic achievement across 
the board and to eliminate the academic achievement gap between 
races.107  It seeks to accomplish these goals by incorporating the 
standards-based accountability and freedom of choice reforms which 
were created after publication of A Nation at Risk, and modified 
throughout the 1990s.108  While Brown gave privilege of access to 
 
 106. Pub. Law 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 
cited to 20 U.S.C. in Supp. II 2002]. 
 107. 20 U.S.C.S. § 6301 (Supp. II 2002).  See also Edward Blum, Two Hundred Ninety-Four 
Months and Counting, 8 TEX. REV. L. POL. 213, 226 (2003) (book review) (with NCLB, “the federal 
government threw its full weight behind closing the racial learning gap”).  President Bush hailed 
the NCLB as an attack on the “soft bigotry of low expectations” and a commitment “to 
eliminating the achievement gap, not hiding it within school or statewide averages.” James S. 
Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation 
Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1746 (2002–2003) (citing Reaching Out . . . Raising 
African American Achievement, No Child Left Behind Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.nclb.gov/start/facts_pdf/achievementgap_aa.pdf). 
 108. 20 U.S.C.S. § 6301 (Supp. II 2002) (“An act to close the achievement gap with 
accountability, flexibility and choice, so that no child is left behind.”); Rudalevige, supra note 74, 
at 24 (President Bush identified accountability as “the first principle” of the law and stated that 
“accountability is the cornerstone of reform”); See also id. at 44 (NCLB embraced accountability 
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education on equal terms through desegregation, the NCLB gives the 
privilege of adequate education on equal terms without regard to 
integration.109 
To achieve its objectives, the NCLB requires states to establish 
“challenging” academic standards in reading, math, and science and 
test all students regularly to ensure they are meeting those 
standards.110  States are free to determine their own “challenging” 
academic standards and the test scores that students must achieve to 
establish the requisite proficiency.111  Test scores are tabulated for 
schools in the aggregate and are also disaggregated by subgroups, 
including migrant students, disabled students, English-language 
learners, and students from all major racial, ethnic, and income 
groups.112 
The test scores and other school indicators, such as attendance 
and graduation rates, are then used to determine if a school is 
making “adequate yearly progress” (AYP) towards the Act’s goal of 
one hundred percent student proficiency by the year 2014.113  All 
students must score at proficient levels by 2014, and in the interim 
states must establish intermediate goals that require an ever-
increasing percentage of students to demonstrate proficiency.114  To 
 
more than any previous federal law); Liebman and Sabel, supra note 107, at 1709–11 (2002–2003) 
(the accountability movement’s shift in the 1990s from punitive measures against students to a 
diagnostic tool for reform and school assessment laid the foundation for the NCLB). 
 109. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 107, at 1705–06. 
 110. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1), (b)(3)(C)(ii) (Supp. II 2002). 
 111. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)–(2) (Supp II 2002).  See also Rudalevige, supra note 74, at 46–47 
(states are given significant flexibility in plans). 
 112. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xiii), (b)(3)(C)(v)(II)(aa)–(dd). 
 113. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2). 
 114. Id. at § 6311(b)(2)(F) (Supp. II 2002).  All schools in a state must make AYP and each 
district must disseminate information about each school’s AYP status.  Id. at § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v), 
(G)(iii), (I).  States and local educational agencies (LEAs) are required to issue report cards which 
include state-wide, district-wide and school-by-school student achievement data broken down by 
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make AYP, the student population as a whole as well as each 
subgroup must meet the proficiency goal, i.e. a sufficient percentage 
of students must perform proficiently on state tests.115  If any 
subgroup fails to make AYP, then the entire school fails to make 
AYP. 
Schools that receive Title I funding—over half of all public 
schools116—and fail to make AYP are deemed “in need of 
improvement” and face increasingly harsh sanctions for every year 
they fail.117  Schools that fail to make AYP for two consecutive years 
are subject to “corrective action,” including but not limited to, 
allowing students to transfer to a non-failing school within the 
district and providing them transportation.118  All non-failing public 
schools within the same district as a failing school must accept 
transfers despite lacking capacity.  If the district does not have 
sufficient capacity in non-failing schools, it must create additional 
capacity or provide choices of other schools.119 
 
subgroup and information on the performance of school districts in making AYP.  Id. at § 
6311(h). 
 115. Id. at § 6311(b)(2)(C), (b)(1)(E); §6316(b)(1)(A).  If a subgroup does not meet 
proficiency goals a school can still make AYP under the “safe harbor” provision.  GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 
ACT: EDUCATION NEEDS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CONDUCT 
IMPLEMENTATION FOR SCHOOL CHOICE PROVISION 6, n.6 (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d057.pdf.  To qualify for “safe harbor” a school must have reduced 
the percentage of students in the failing subgroup by at least 10% in the previous year and the 
subgroup must show progress on other academic indicators such as graduation and drop-out 
rates.  Id. 
 116. DEP’T OF EDUC., FACT SHEET ON TITLE I, PART A, available at  
http://www.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/title1-factsheet.pdf (2002) (reporting that 58% of public 
schools receive Title I funding). 
 117. 20 U.S.C. § 6316. 
 118. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)–(F)(i), (9) (2000 & Supp. II 2002); 34 C.F.R. § 200.44.  Schools 
must also create an improvement plan and are entitled to technical assistance from the state.  20 
U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1) (Supp. II 2002).  “Corrective action” may also include decreasing the 
management authority at the school level and restructuring a school’s internal organization.  Id. § 
6316(b)(7)(C)(iv). 
 119. 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(d). 
01__GARDA.DOC 11/1/2007  3:48:37 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 35 ? 
After three consecutive years of failure, schools must offer 
supplemental education services, such as tutoring, to low income 
students who did not transfer.120  After a fourth year of failure schools 
enter the “corrective” phase, which includes such measures as 
instituting new curriculum, replacing staff, and appointing 
educational expert advisors.121  A fifth consecutive year of failure 
triggers the “alternative governance” or “restructuring” sanctions, 
which require either conversion to a charter school, reconstitution, 
private management, or state takeover.122  On the other hand, schools 
that continually increase test scores and reach benchmark levels 
receive increased federal budgets.123 
The NCLB marries standards based accountability to freedom of 
choice remedies.  It federalizes the standards based accountability 
movement and holds schools, rather than students, accountable for 
student failure.  The high stakes testing of students in the 1980s and 
1990s is now high stakes testing for schools and districts, where test 
scores determine whether teachers, administrators and schools avoid 
sanctions.  The NCLB places education reform squarely on the 
emerging path of accountability and choice to create equal 
opportunity for poor and minority students. 
IV 
THE PRESENT STATE OF EDUCATION REFORM 
The trajectory of past education reforms aimed at equalizing 
opportunity for minorities illuminates certain predictable trends.  
 
 120. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8) (Supp. II 2002). 
 121. Id. § 6316(b)(7)(C). 
 122. Id. § 6316(b)(7)–(8). 
 123. Helen A. Moore, Testing Whiteness:  No Child or No School Left Behind?, 18 WASH. U. J. 
L. & POL’Y 173, 176 (2005). 
01__GARDA.DOC 11/1/2007  3:48:37 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 36 ? 
Each reform met with initial resistance.  Desegregation floundered 
for ten years, equity finance litigation achieved only limited success 
for its first two decades, while voucher programs, charter schools, 
and accountability, though pushed after A Nation at Risk, did not 
gain traction until the 1990s.  The initial opposition to these 
movements was followed by significant support, as the government, 
courts and public warmed to the new reforms.  Desegregation reform 
peaked from 1964–1973 with strong support from the three branches 
of government, adequacy claims in finance litigation enjoyed success 
throughout the 1990s, and accountability and freedom of choice 
flourished in the 1990s culminating in the No Child Left Behind Act.  
The question now is whether these new reforms will repeat the 
history of desegregation.  After only seven years of serious 
enforcement the courts and government abandoned integration and, 
frustrated with its failure to achieve equality, society soon followed.  
Alternative avenues to educational equity appeared in the reform 
landscape and integration was deserted.  The finance reform, choice 
and accountability movements will likely meet this same fate.  This 
Part will discuss the current status of integration, school finance 
litigation, standards based accountability, voucher programs, and 
charter schools.  It will then examine why these reforms cannot 
achieve the same level of equality that is derived from integration, 
and why desegregation was discarded despite its advantages over 
other educational reforms. 
A. Accountability, Finance Reform, Choice and Integration. 
Due to the NCLB, every state education system operates under a 
standards based accountability regime and their Title I schools are 
becoming increasingly subject to sanction.  As of the 2005–2006 
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school year, roughly sixteen percent of all schools and twenty-four 
percent of all districts are failing to make AYP.124  Ten percent of 
schools nationwide are subject to the choice sanctions of the NCLB 
while three percent are subject to the corrective and restructuring 
sanctions.125  Most of the schools sanctioned for failing to make AYP 
are poor, urban minority schools.  Roughly eighty-eight percent of 
African Americans and Latinos are in schools that fall below their 
state mandated minimum proficiency rating.126 
While accountability is just beginning to kick-in, finance reform 
continues to evolve.  As of 2006, the finance schemes of forty-five 
states have been challenged, yielding twenty-six victories.127  Several 
new trends are apparent in the changing nature of the finance reform 
movement.  First, some courts are beginning to accept that vertical 
equity finance systems—formulas which provide more resources to 
students with greater needs—are necessary for states to provide a 
constitutionally adequate education.128  Students from poor families 
are more expensive to educate than middle-class students, because 
 
 124. Ctr. on Educ. Pol'y, From the Capital to the Classroom: Year 4 of the No Child Left Behind 
Act (2006), http://www.cep-dc.org/nclb/Year4/CEP-NCLB-Report-4.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 
2007). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, Unintended Consequences of Racial Subgroup 
Rules, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 74, at 152, 157. 
 127. Access, "Equity" and "Adequacy" School Funding Decisions, 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/equityandadequacytable.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) 
(identifying states in which plaintiffs prevailed); Access, Litigations Challenging Constitutionality 
of K-12 Funding in the 50 States,  http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/In-
Process%20Litigations.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (noting that only Delaware, Hawaii, 
Mississippi and Utah have not had their school finance schemes challenged); see also Martha 
Minow, Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 17 n.29 (2004) 
(providing information on lawsuits as of 2002).  In the past twenty-five years, thirty-four states 
have implemented some reform, by judicial order or legislative initiative, to satisfy states’ 
constitutional obligations to provide equal or adequate funding for schools.  John C. Brittain, A 
Look at Brown v. Board of Education, in 2054, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 29, 35 (Fall/Winter 
2004). 
 128. Ryan & Saunders, supra note 83, at 465, 468–72. 
01__GARDA.DOC 11/1/2007  3:48:37 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 38 ? 
they experience biological and social deficits which require more 
educational resources to overcome.129  Horizontal equity finance 
schemes which provide equal finances across all districts do not take 
into account the disparate costs to provide an adequate education 
between poor and middle class students.  Instead of asking how 
much it costs to provide and average student with an adequate 
education, some courts are beginning to ask how much it costs to 
adequately educate different types of students in the state.  It is for 
this reason that costing out studies—studies establishing the cost of 
an adequate education for particularized students—are gaining 
prominence in finance litigation.130 
Courts are also adopting accountability principles in adequacy 
finance litigation.  The debate over whether an adequate education 
should be defined by educational inputs (resources, facilities, teacher 
qualifications, teacher to student ratios, etc.), educational outputs 
(student performance), or a combination of both, is longstanding.  
One significant advantage of adequacy litigation over equity 
litigation is that it permits courts to consider more than just 
educational inputs.131  The issue recently arose in the New York 
finance litigation, where the court held that inputs are the primary 
measure of adequacy but allowed the state to use outputs—student 
performance on standardized tests—as evidence of adequacy.132  
 
 129. Robert Garda, The New IDEA: Shifting Educational Paradigms to Achieve Racial Equality 
in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1086 (2004) (identifying social and biological factors 
negatively impacting students from low income families). 
 130. Ryan & Saunders, supra note 83, at 475–77; see Access, Costing Out, 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/policy/CostingOut/overview.php3 (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) 
(“[S]tates and education advocacy organizations have increasingly turned to ‘costing-out studies’ 
to obtain rationally based, objective information . . . .”). 
 131. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (requiring state 
of Kentucky to improve seven educational outputs).  See generally Liebman & Sabel, supra note 
73, at 205. 
 132. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 345–47 (N.Y. 2003). 
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Courts that define adequacy through student performance are 
increasingly finding that accountability is a constitutional 
requirement of an adequate education.133  In Claremont School 
District v. Governor, for example, the court held that “accountability 
is an essential component of the State’s [constitutional] duty” to 
ensure that the court’s definition of an adequate education is “subject 
to meaningful application.” 134  Courts in finance litigation, in short, 
are beginning to borrow heavily from standards-based accountability 
by incorporating legislatively-created educational standards into the 
definition of an adequate education and requiring monitoring of 
whether those standards are achieved. 
As the finance and accountability reforms merge, much like 
integration and finance reform merged in the 1970s, the freedom of 
choice movement continues to grow.  Currently thirty-six thousand 
students are being served by public voucher programs in Ohio, 
Florida, Wisconsin and Washington, D.C., and seventy-thousand 
students are served by private voucher programs.135  This represents 
only a fraction of a percentage of all students in the United States, but 
voucher programs did not begin their growth spurt until the late 
 
 133. Dayton & Dupre, supra note 54, at 2396–97 (2004); Ryan & Saunders, supra note 83, at 
474 (“[S]tandards will continue to play a prominent role in adequacy lawsuits.”); Michael Heise, 
Educational Jujitsu, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2002, at 31–32.  For a critique of courts’ use of legislative 
standards to define adequacy, see Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in 
State Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241 (2003). 
 134. 794 A.2d 744, 745, 751 (N.H. 2002); see also Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 
S.W.3d 472, 511 (Ark. 2002) (stating that the court is willing to review the adequacy and eqality of 
the state's school-funding system). 
 135. Moe, supra note 26, at 149; Sam Dillon, For Parents Seeking Choice, Charter Schools Prove 
More Popular than Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at B8.  Maine and Vermont have long-
standing voucher programs for children in rural areas that do not have a public school.  Educ. 
Comm'n of the States, Policy Brief: Vouchers 1, 7, 
http://www/ecs/org/clearinghouse/58/76/5876.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2007); see also Alexander & 
Alexander, supra note 26, at 1149–50 (noting that six states have voucher programs). 
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1990s.136  A handful of Republicans recently proposed a nationwide 
one hundred million dollar voucher program for twenty-eight 
thousand low income and minority students, but this still would 
affect only a fraction of public school students.137 
Charter schools experienced significantly more growth than 
vouchers through the 1990s.  There were virtually no charter schools 
in 1992 but the numbers today are staggering.  Currently forty states 
and the District of Columbia have enacted charter school enabling 
statutes and more than thirty-six hundred charter schools are 
operating across the United States serving more than one million 
children.138  Four hundred and twenty-four new charter schools 
opened in the 2005-2006 school year,  an increase in thirteen percent 
over the previous year, and charter schools now account for four 
percent of the nation’s public schools.139 
Finally, integration appears completely lifeless.  The government 
and public believe that “reform efforts should be directed solely at 
improving the education that minority students receive, regardless of 
 
 136. In 1999, Florida became the first state to enact a statewide voucher program, which 
awards opportunity scholarships to students in failing schools and students with disabilities.  
Moe, supra note 26, at 149–50; John Tierney, A Chance to Escape, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at 
A23; Educ. Comm'n of the States, supra note 135.  In 2003, Colorado created a voucher program 
for low income students in eleven school districts.  Id.  In 2004, the federal government created 
vouchers for students in the District of Columbia public schools with priority to low income 
families.  Id.  In 2005, Ohio expanded its Cleveland voucher program and implemented the largest 
voucher program in the nation, creating fourteen-thousand publicly financed scholarships to 
allow students in failing schools to attend private schools.  Dillon, supra note 135, at 8.  The Utah 
legislature also recently created vouchers for use by students with disabilities.  Id. 
 137. Diane Jean Schemo, Republicans Propose National School Voucher Program, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 19, 2006, at A17. 
 138. Ctr. for Educ. Reform, http://www.edreform.com/index.cfm?fuseAction=stateStats& 
pSectionID=15&cSectionID=44 (last visited Feb. 7, 2007); see also Loveless, supra note 98, at 177–
78 (chronicling the rise of charter schools in the 1990s). 
 139. Ctr. for Educ. Reform, Charter Schools by the Numbers, 
http://www.edreform.com/_upload/charters-by-number.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).  The 
previous school year saw a 15% increase in the number of charter schools.  Id. 
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whether those students are in integrated or segregated schools.”140  
National consensus shows that integrated schools are an accepted 
goal but “we should not do anything promote them.”141  In fact, the 
public resists desegregation far more than it resists equalized 
funding, though both entail significant sacrifices.142  The current 
educational reforms winnow any remaining support for integration 
by promising to improve educational outcomes in segregated 
schools. 
B. The Benefits of Integration and the Reasons it was 
Abandoned. 
The retreat from desegregation comes despite the significant 
achievements of Brown and the immense benefits of racial and 
socioeconomic integration, which cannot be reproduced in 
segregated schools, recognized in social science research.  In thirty 
short years, Brown changed the centuries-old structure of de jure 
segregation and transformed schools in the South from the most 
segregated to the least segregated in the country.143  The Supreme 
Court’s unprecedented reliance on social science evidence in Brown 
to justify its holding resulted in a virtual cottage industry researching 
the advantages of desegregation.  The research since Brown focuses 
 
 140. Ryan, The Influence of Race, supra note 12, at 479.  A recent argument made by an 
African American school board member opposing the creation of diverse magnet schools in New 
Orleans exemplifies America’s current state of mind:  “[i]t’s not about diversity any more.  It’s 
about whether or not schools have the same resources . . . . It’s about equity.”  Brian Thevenot, 
Drawn Apart, TIMES PICAYUNE, May 18, 2004, at 1. 
 141. RICHARD KALLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS 
THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 42 (2001).  Nancy Levit argues that there is a national impulse 
to resegregate our schools based on identity characteristics such as race, sex and sexual preference.  
Levit, supra note 90, at 459. 
 142. Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2057–58 (opposition to mandatory racial integration still 
exists); Ryan, Sheff, supra note 54, at 566. 
 143. CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 6;  OGLETREE, supra note 22, at 59–60; Boger, supra note 
49, at 1387. 
01__GARDA.DOC 11/1/2007  3:48:37 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 42 ? 
on essentially four benefits: the self-esteem of minorities, the 
academic achievement of minorities, the long-term effects on 
education and employment for minorities, and the effects on 
intergroup relations. 
Modern findings call into doubt the Supreme Court’s rationale 
that segregation harms the self-esteem of minority students.  
Research since Brown fails to establish a clear link between 
desegregation and black self-esteem.  In fact, integration may have 
negatively impacted the self-esteem of black students by subjecting 
them to overt discrimination and more demanding academic 
curriculums.144 
A more compelling justification for integration, not expressed in 
Brown, is its positive effect on minority academic achievement.  This 
rationale invites controversy, as finding that minorities learn better 
only when seated next to whites is repugnant to minorities and the 
product of an arrogant subordination mentality of whites.  Similar to 
Malcolm X’s discontent with desegregation in the 1970s, Justice 
Thomas and critical race theorists bristle at calls for integration, 
because it is founded on the idea “that blacks cannot succeed without 
the benefit of the company of whites.”145  The controversy began with 
the Coleman Report of 1966, which suggested that increasing contact 
among black and white students would raise achievement levels of 
black children without harming the performance of whites.146  
Research since the Coleman Report yields mixed results, and the 
debate is ongoing as to whether minorities perform better in 
 
 144. CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 187; Guinier, supra note 10, at 90–91. 
 145. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 119 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Ryan, 
Sheff, supra note 54, at 552 n.74 (identifying critical race theorists opposing desegregation because 
it rests on the grounds that nonwhites can only perform well when educated with whites). 
 146. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966). 
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integrated schools.147  There is at least general consensus that 
desegregation led to moderate gains for black students without 
negatively impacting white students.148 
While the connection between racial diversity and minority 
achievement is controversial, there is virtually unanimous agreement 
that there is a direct link between a student’s socioeconomic status 
and educational performance.  The Coleman Report found that a 
student’s socioeconomic status is the greatest determinant of school 
success, and that the socioeconomic status of a student’s peers 
significantly influences academic performance.149  The poorer the 
 
 147. Compare JUDITH BLAU, RACE IN THE SCHOOLS: PERPETUATING WHITE DOMINANCE? 203 
(2003) (arguing that segregation, whether de facto or de jure, disadvantages minority 
schoolchildren), and Derek Black, The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest: 
Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923, 943–45 (2002) (citing studies concluding 
that racial diversity in schools results in better teaching and learning and higher achievement for 
minorities), and Boger, supra note 49, at 1437–40 (finding that students in segregated schools 
consistently perform worse on high stakes tests than do students in diverse schools), and Kevin 
Brown, The Road Not Taken in Brown: Recognizing the Dual Harm of Segregation, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1579, 1590 (2004), and Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science 
Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 741–42 (1998) (citing studies concluding that African Americans 
attain greater academic success in majority white schools than in majority black schools), and Liu 
and Taylor, supra note 92, at 792, 796–97 (2005) (arguing that desegregation enhances academic 
achievement of blacks), and McUsic, supra note 23, at 1354–55 (concluding that integration leads 
to improved African American academic performance), and Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 
12 (noting that students in integrated schools perform better on standardized tests); Gary Orfield 
& Chungmei Lee, Harvard Univ. Civil Rights Project, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's 
Nightmare? 22–26 (2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/ 
reseg04/resegregation04.php (finding that minorities perform better in integrated schools), with 
CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 187 (finding little evidence supporting the idea that blacks achieve 
better in integrated settings); Ryan, Sheff, supra note 54, at 555 (citing conflicting studies). 
 148. CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 38; Ryan, Sheff, supra note 54, at 555 (stating that minority 
achievement improved during integration era) (stating that in 1954 the percent of nonwhites 
attending college for four or more years was 2.1% which was one-third the rate for whites of 6.3%.  
By 2000, 16.5% of nonwhites attended college for four or more years compared to 26.1% of 
whites); Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 67 (noting that desegregation improved minority 
graduation rates and reduced test score gaps until the 1990s); Richard Rothstein, Must Schools 
Fail, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 2, 2004, available at http://nybooks.com/articles/17598.  
Achievement gap between whites and nonwhites also decreased during desegregation but began 
increasing in the 1990s as desegregation ended.  Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 10. 
 149. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 146, at 304 (arguing that “student body characteristics” 
account for “an impressive percent of variance” in student achievement, and the influence is 
greatest on students from disadvantaged backgrounds).  A more recent government study, the 
01__GARDA.DOC 11/1/2007  3:48:37 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 44 ? 
child, and the poorer the child’s classmates, the less likely the child 
will succeed academically.  Many studies since the Coleman Report 
conclude that the socioeconomic status of the student body is the 
most important, school-related factor for academic success, even 
more important than an individual student’s wealth.150  The reasons 
for this conclusion are varied, but it is clear that when poor students 
are integrated into middle-class schools, their academic achievement 
improves without affecting the achievement of their advantaged 
peers.  In short, socioeconomic integration—the indirect result of 
racial integration—leads to higher academic achievement for 
minorities. 
The third advantage of integration, also not mentioned in Brown, 
is that it improves minorities’ long term life chances.  Black students 
from integrated schools are more likely to attend college, receive 
higher grades while in college, graduate from college, find white 
collar and professional jobs, and earn higher wages than black 
students from segregated schools.151  These outcomes are partially 
explained by the socioeconomic diversity of integrated schools.  
Another explanation is that networks and information previously 
closed to minorities in segregated schools become opened in 
integrated schools.  The social networks minority students create in 
integrated schools allow access to information and modes of 
 
Prospects report, found that economically disadvantaged children scored lower on tests when they 
attended schools with high concentrations of poverty than when they were in mixed-income 
schools.  U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CHAPTER 1 PROGRAM: THE 
INTERIM REPORT 27–31 (1992). 
 150. Boger, supra note 49, at 1412–23 (discussing research regarding link between 
socioeconomic status and educational performance); McUsic, supra note 23, at 1355–58 (finding 
that the socioeconomic status of a student’s classmates is a critical variable in determining a 
student’s academic performance). 
 151. Black, supra note 147, at 943–45 (citing studies concluding that racial diversity in schools 
results in better teaching and learning, increased employment opportunities, improved civic 
values, and higher achievement and educational opportunities); Liu & Taylor, supra note 92, at 
797 (examining studies finding that desegregation enhances later life chances). 
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behavior that are helpful in gaining college admission, scholarships, 
and jobs.152  While the short-term academic effects of racial 
integration are controversial, the beneficial long-term effects are well 
accepted. 
The fourth advantage of integration—the improvement of racial 
attitudes and intergroup relations—is the most accepted justification 
for desegregation.  The social benefits of integration were the 
primary reason the architects of Brown elected to pursue integration 
rather than equalize separate schools.  They believed that by altering 
the racial composition of schools they could re-engineer society 
along nonracial fault lines.  Gordon Allport’s classic 1954 study laid 
the foundation for the universally accepted “contact theory.”  Allport 
concluded that members of a racial group typically hold members of 
the minority in low-esteem and that no contact, or casual contact, 
between these groups serves only to reinforce negative stereotypes.153  
Prejudice declines substantially, however, when casual contact gives 
way to closer acquaintance and especially when individuals of 
different races are engaged as equals in pursuit of a common goal.154  
Racially diverse classrooms create this contact and reduce cultural 
ignorance and the resulting fear of the unknown. 
Because of contact theory, the benefit to intergroup relations is 
the most accepted of all integration rationales.  There is a consensus 
among experts and the public “that integration is a desirable policy 
goal, mainly for the social benefit of increased information and 
understanding about cultural and social differences among various 
 
 152. CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 192. 
 153. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 263–64 (1954). 
 154. Id. at 264 (“In contrast to casual contacts, most studies show that true acquaintance 
lessens prejudice.”); id. at 281 (“Prejudice . . . may be reduced by equal status contact between 
majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals.”). 
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racial and ethnic groups.”155  The Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized the benefit of diverse educational settings.  Justice 
Marshall, dissenting in Milliken I, recognized that “unless our 
children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people 
will ever learn to live together.”156 Justice Powell, in Regents of Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, noted that nothing less than the “nation’s future 
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and 
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”157  Most 
recently in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court found that 
diversity yields substantial educational benefits such as promoting 
cross-racial understanding, breaking racial stereotypes, and enabling 
students to better understand persons of different races.158 
Experience proves the Court correct.  The desegregation of the 
last fifty years expanded the extent of interracial acquaintances and 
friendships.  Interracial contact increased markedly after Brown in 
public schools, private schools, and universities.159  As predicted by 
contact theory, these expanded friendships and acquaintances led to 
more tolerant racial attitudes as students in diverse schools 
understood racial and ethnic cultural differences.  The benefits of this 
contact are now realized with a dramatic increase in racial tolerance 
over the last fifty years.160 
Contact theory underscores the importance of school integration, 
because segregation is self-perpetuating.  Products of integrated 
 
 155. David J. Armor, Facts and Fictions About Education in the Sheff Decision, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 981, 982 (1997). 
 156. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 157. 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).  He concluded that both “tradition and experience lend support 
to the view that the contribution of diversity is substantial.”  Id. 
 158. 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
 159. CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 179–81. 
 160. Id. at 38–39, 181, 188–91, 195; Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 10. 
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schools, because they are more tolerant and understanding of other 
races, are more likely to work and live in integrated environments, 
which in turn leads to more school integration.161  It is imperative 
that interracial contact exist in schools for all races to live and work 
together.162 
Despite the immense benefits of integration that cannot be 
replicated in separate but equal schools, it was deserted because 
Brown did not meet lofty expectations and integration was 
improperly viewed as a failure.  Brown fell far short of creating 
permanently desegregated schools and significantly increasing 
contact among racial groups for several reasons.  First, as noted 
above, the courts retreated from racially balancing schools only 
twenty short years after Brown.  They quickly tired of 
micromanaging school district policies ranging from student and 
teacher assignment plans to extracurricular offerings and teacher pay 
scales.  They conveniently ignored the significant social science 
evidence supporting racially diverse schools in order to return local 
control to school boards.  Indeed, the benefits of integration are 
formally irrelevant to modern courts deciding whether to dismantle a 
desegregation order.163  Disregarding the benefits of integration 
permits courts to return control to local school boards without 
remorse, thus hastening the demise of integration. 
 
 161. Note, Lessons in Humanity: Diversity as Compelling State Interest in Public Education, 40 
B.C. L. REV. 995, 1023 (1999) (citing studies establishing that students attending desegregated 
schools were more likely to work in racially mixed environments); Frankenberg et al., supra note 
6, at 12–13 (examining studies showing that an integrated education helps students work with 
members of other races and ethnic groups). 
 162. Boger, supra note 49, at 1411; Orfield, Inherently Unequal, supra note 3 ("Segregation is a 
fundamental structure of society, and it is profoundly self-perpetuating, even in the absence of 
overt discrimination."); Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 12–13 ("[I]nterracial exposure in K-12 
education can help break the perpetual cycles of educational and occupational segregation . . . ."). 
 163. Levit, supra note 90, at 460, 478–82; James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social 
Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1673 (2003). 
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The second factor blunting the effect of Brown was white aversion 
to integration and avoidance of racially mixed schools.164  The “white 
flight” to suburbs and private schools prevented meaningful and 
universal integration.  The residential segregation resulting from 
white flight has declined since its post-Milliken I plateau, but it is still 
greater today than it was in the pre-Brown era and is worsening.165  
Because districts typically assign students to neighborhood schools, 
the current residential segregation is the most significant factor 
preventing school integration.166 
Whites avoided integrated schools not only through white flight, 
but also by opposing efforts to desegregate their racially insulated 
suburban schools.  Once white suburban schools were threatened 
with integration, the courts and legislatures lost their resolve to 
racially balance the schools.167  As Charles Clotfelter aptly notes,  
[t]he social world of the public schools, especially the public high 
school, could have been turned on its head by desegregation.  
Through various means, whites, the more powerful group in 
 
 164. CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 8, 91, 96, 181.  White aversion continues today, as whites 
residing in successful integrated school districts that are celebrated for academic achievement 
continue to send their children elsewhere and their schools are resegregating.  Amy Stuart Wells 
& Jennifer Jelison Holme, No Accountability for Diversity: Standardized Tests and the Demise of 
Racially Mixed Schools, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK 187 (John 
Charles Boger et al. eds., 2005). 
 165. CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 78–81, 184 (noting that the racial disparity between 
districts is widening, and Latinos are currently the most residentially segregated race); Boger, 
supra note 49, at 1401–03 (“[O]verall levels of residential segregation remain very high for African 
Americans in most metropolitan areas.”); Heise, supra note 47, at 2432 (“African Americans are 
more [residentially] segregated today than they were in 1940.”); Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 
2094 (“Hispanics have experienced similar, though less dramatic, residential segregation.”).  See 
generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (arguing that American residential segregation is 
intense and worsening). 
 166. Chemerinsky, supra note 50, at 1462; Liu & Taylor, supra note 92, at 792 (finding that 
neighborhood school attendance policies are the primary obstacle to desegregation because of 
high levels of residential segregation); James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban 
Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635, 1644 (2004) [hereinafter Suburban Veto]. 
 167. See generally Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2051–52. 
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most schools, were able to preserve some of the elements of the 
previous social order, thus moderating the extent of change in 
social relations.168 
The third factor minimizing the effect of Brown was the desertion 
of integrative principals by minorities in favor of resource and 
outcome equalization.  Integration is not merely ignored today, but 
maligned.  Modern anti-subordination theory endorses voluntary 
racial separation in the schools.  It posits that equal educational 
opportunity is not achieved by desegregating the schools and treating 
all students equally, but rather that equality can be achieved only by 
treating disparately situated people differently.169  Anti-
subordinationists argue that separate education is sometimes 
necessary in order to achieve equal educational opportunity, because 
minorities do not achieve in white schools due to bias, therefore, 
separate schools for minorities will free them from this 
discrimination and allow them to flourish.170  Anti-subordinationists 
believe that segregation, when voluntary, is the best way to achieve 
equality in education, and often embrace the de facto segregation of 
today’s schools, so long as they are equal. 
Finally, the promise of Brown was blunted by the rise of 
alternative legal avenues for minorities to attain an equal education.  
Integration was no longer viewed as necessary to attain a high quality 
 
 168. CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 182; see also Minow, supra note 127, at 15 (“The continuing 
failure to realize the vision of Brown seems persistently linked to the white resistance that fault 
line represents.”). 
 169. Minow, supra note 127, at 29 (“[I]ntegration is not the exclusive way to achieve equal 
opportunity; treating people the same who are different is not equal treatment.”). 
 170. See, e.g., W.E. Burghardt DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. OF NEGRO 
EDUC. 328, 333–35 (1935); Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex Public Education after VMI: The Case for 
Women’s Schools, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 76–77 (1998); Pamela J. Smith, All-Male Black 
Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REV. 2003, 
2014–15 (1992); Kristina Britten, Comment, Equal Protection Theory and the Harvey Milk High 
School: Why Anti-Subordination Alone is Not Enough, 45 B.C. L. REV. 869, 878–79 (2004). 
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education for minority students once finance reform, freedom of 
choice and accountability promised to create truly equal but 
segregated schools.  Integration yielded to finance reform, which is 
now yielding to school choice and accountability.  It is uncertain 
what new reform movements loom on the horizon that will displace 
choice and accountability, but replacement will certainly be sought 
because the equality guaranteed by these new education reform 
movements is as illusory as equality during the Plessey “separate but 
equal” era and will continue to be impossible to attain in the future. 
C. Minorities in Today’s Schools 
White-aversion, residential segregation, the desertion of 
integration principals by civil rights leaders and the judiciary, and the 
rise of alternative legal reform avenues curbed the effect of Brown 
and decreased the amount of interracial contact hoped for by its 
architects.  These factors reduced the pace of desegregation since the 
1970s and led to the rapid resegregation of our nation’s schools 
today.171  Incredibly, schools are more segregated today than they 
were in 1954 and the rate of resegregation is rapidly increasing.172  
Furthermore, all types of American school districts are resegregating.  
Every major urban school district is majority, nonwhite, and 
segregated, and suburban schools are getting whiter. 173 
 
 171. Ogletree, supra note 22, at 235, 256, 259.  See generally McUsic, supra note 23. 
 172. Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 5, 37, 42, 67; Erica Frankenberg & Chungmei Lee, 
Harvard Univ. Civil Rights Project, Charter Schools and Race: A Lost Opportunity for Integrated 
Education 2 (2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/ 
CharterSchools.php (“[B]lack and Latino students are more isolated than they have been for three 
decades.”); Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton, Harvard Univ. Civil Rights Project, Back to 
Segregation (2004); available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/articles/ 
reseg.php.  There are less black students in majority white schools than in any period since 1968.  
Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 37.  Black students’ exposure to white students has been 
steadily falling since 1980. Id. at 41. 
 173. Id. at 5, 53–62.  Only 14% of the 14,952 schools in the nation’s 100 largest districts have 
enrollments that match the nation’s profile.  Sandra Clark, Finding a New Route to Equal 
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All racial groups currently attend schools in which a majority of 
the student body is composed of students of their own race.174  
Seventy percent of black students attend schools in which racial 
minorities are a majority and one-third of black students are in 
schools that are ninety to one hundred percent minority.175  Latinos 
are even more racially segregated, not only by race and ethnicity but 
also poverty.176  Whites continue to be the most isolated group.  
White students have little contact with minorities despite the fact 
that minority enrollment in schools is increasing while white 
enrollment is decreasing.177 
Extreme socioeconomic isolation accompanies today’s racial and 
ethnic concentrations.  Indeed, poverty concentration in today’s 
schools is greater than racial and ethnic concentration.  Urban school 
districts contain high concentrations of minority students and 
students from poor families.178  Over half of the students in schools 
attended by African Americans and Latinos are poor or near poor 
 
Achievement, CATALYST FOR CLEVELAND SCHOOLS, http://catalyst-cleveland.org/04-
00/equalach.htm.  The minority enrollment in 11,399 of these schools is more than 41%. Id. 
 174. OGLETREE, supra note 22, at 261; Rahdert, supra note 47, at 786, 800; Frankenberg et al., 
supra note 6, at 27. 
 175. Adam Cohen, The Supreme Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at A4.  One sixth of all 
black students attend apartheid schools, which are entirely nonwhite and have high 
concentrations of poverty.  Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 5.  Five percent of all students 
attend apartheid schools.  Id. at 28. 
 176. Chemerinsky, supra note 50, at 1463; Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 4, 32, 33. 
 177. Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 4, 27, 47; Orfield and Lee, supra note 147 
(“[Although] American public schools are now only sixty percent white nationwide and nearly 
one-fourth of U.S. students are in states with a majority of nonwhite students . . . except in the 
South and Southwest, most white students have little contact with minority students.”); see also 
CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 35 (tracking changes in racial compositions in schools since 1954). 
 178. Heise, supra note 47, at 2427 (“Indeed, the correlation between race and poverty, at least 
in the education context, is startling.”); Ryan, supra note 15, at 272–75; Frankenberg & Lee, supra 
note 172, at 2 (“The increasing  isolation is not just isolation by race but also by poverty . . . . ”). 
01__GARDA.DOC 11/1/2007  3:48:37 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 52 ? 
compared to only twenty percent of the students in schools attended 
by whites.179 
The combination of extreme racial and poverty concentrations 
exacerbates the current academic achievement gap between white 
and nonwhite students.180  Because racial isolation accompanies 
socioeconomic isolation, minorities today suffer disastrous 
educational results.  Minorities are concentrated in poorly 
performing, high poverty schools that experience lower achievement 
scores, graduation rates, and college matriculation rates and higher 
dropout rates than their suburban counterparts.181  Socioeconomic 
isolation, rather than racial segregation, is the predominant factor 
causing disparities between races in academic achievement.182 
Federal and state legislatures, courts, and the public will not 
revive integration to combat these disparities.  America’s retreat from 
the integration path to equality is complete, displaced by the 
promises of choice, equal resources and improved educational 
 
 179. Boger, supra note 49, at 1419 (“[M]inority children comprise 77% of the student bodies 
in high-poverty schools . . . . ”); Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 35; Frankenberg & Lee, supra 
note 172, at 2 (“[N]early nine-tenths of intensely segregated black and Latino schools have 
student bodies with concentrated poverty.”). 
 180. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, Understanding the Black-White Test Score Gap In 
the First Two Years of School, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 447, 461 (May 2004) (concluding that the 
achievement gap can be attributed to the generally lower quality schools that black children 
attend); see also Kane & Staiger, supra note 126, at 154–55, 172 (identifying current academic 
achievement gap between minorities and whites); Peterson & West, supra note 74, at 4  (“[T]he 
long-standing difference in average math scores of black and white students in American schools . 
. . is approximately 1.0 standard deviation, as is the performance difference between typical fourth 
and eighth graders.”); Nat’l Assessment of Educ. Progress, The Nation’s Report Card, 
http://www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard (identifying current academic achievement gap 
between minorities and whites). 
 181. Boger, supra note 49, at 1419; Brittain, supra note 127, at 32; Chemerinsky, supra note 
50, at 1468; Levit, supra note 90, at 497–98; Ryan, supra note 49, at 272–75. 
 182. See Brittain, supra note 127, at 33; Lewin, supra note 23, at 125–26 (concluding that 
because school performance is more associated with class than race, minorities in segregated 
schools perform poorly because of the high concentrations of children from poor families, not 
because of racial concentrations). 
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outcomes.  Charles Boger locates the American education system in a 
“perfect storm”—where the end of desegregation combined with the 
standards based movement and financial disparity among school 
districts creates segregated and unequal schools.183  Yet, the current 
situation is not a fleeting weather pattern, but instead a permanent 
climatic shift in education reform, and our schools will remain 
separate and unequal into the foreseeable future. 
V 
THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION: SEPARATE BUT UNEQUAL 
By lining up the historical path of education reform with the 
current state of education, the future trajectory of education becomes 
apparent: Schools will return to the past path of “separate but equal” 
in name, but separate and unequal in practice.  The new “separate 
and equal” paradigm is expected to succeed where Plessey failed, 
because racial separation is now voluntary instead of state mandated, 
equality requires both resource and outcome equity, and school 
choice will remedy inequality.  These distinctions will not make a 
practical difference to our students, however, as our separate schools 
will continue to produce disparate educational opportunities for our 
poor and minority students. 
A. Finance Litigation 
The school finance reform movement will not reverse the 
growing racial and socioeconomic isolation in schools.  Quite the 
opposite will occur as the false promise that finance litigation will 
yield equal funding, and an adequate education obviates the need to 
pursue racial and socioeconomic integration.  It has already proven 
 
 183. See generally Boger, supra note 49. 
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to be a “costly distraction” that “unwittingly” legitimizes de facto 
segregation.184  With the hope that all schools will be sufficiently 
funded to yield adequate educational outcomes, parents have little 
reason to demand integration.  In a 1994 Gallup poll, sixty-four 
percent of African Americans considered increased funding to be the 
best way to help minorities, compared to only twenty-five percent 
who selected integration.  Furthermore, sixty-four percent said they 
would choose local schools over integrated schools outside of their 
community.185  School finance reform also leads away from 
integration by submerging the important socializing component of 
education.  By defining schools as merely a combination of inputs 
that lead to measurable academic outcomes, finance reform degrades 
education’s role in shaping social attitudes and leads away from, not 
towards, integration.186 
Finance litigation could be used to integrate schools.  In Sheff v. 
O’Neill, the Connecticut Supreme Court combined the state 
segregation clause with the education clause to find that even when 
resources are divided evenly, “the existence of extreme racial and 
ethnic isolation in the public school system deprives schoolchildren 
of substantially equal educational opportunity.”187  Because the court 
ordered that students be divided evenly by race and ethnicity, and 
not merely that money be divided evenly, Sheff was hailed as a 
landmark decision at the time.188  Scholars strongly advocated for 
other courts to consider the racial composition of a classroom a 
 
 184. Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, supra note 49, at 315–16. 
 185. Ryan & Saunders, supra note 83, at 480. 
 186. Brittain, supra note 127, at 35. 
 187. 678 A.2d 1267, 1281 (Conn. 1996). 
 188. See, e.g., John C. Brittain, Why Sheff v. O’Neill Is a Landmark Decision, 30 CONN. L. REV. 
211 (1997). 
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critical educational input for an adequate education.189  But Sheff is 
more anomaly than signpost.  A similar claim was rejected in Paynter 
v. State, No. 75, wherein the plaintiffs conceded that New York had 
sufficiently funded the Rochester school district but faulted the state 
for policies that resulted in high concentrations of minority and low 
income students which denied them their state constitutional right to 
an adequate education.190  The court held that the plaintiff’s claim 
connecting racial isolation to inadequate education “has no relation 
to the discernible objectives of the Education Article.”191 
Paytner’s holding that racial and socioeconomic integration are 
not integral components of an adequate education is likely more 
indicative than Sheff of the future of school finance litigation.  Most 
state constitutions do not include Connecticut’s unique segregation 
clause making it analytically challenging for other courts to apply the 
Sheff rationale.  More importantly, the last decade of integration 
decisions created reluctance, even antipathy, by courts to interfere in 
local control over student assignment policies.  This disinclination, 
combined with the modern era reforms, create a judicial mindset to 
focus on input and output equality without regard to racial or 
socioeconomic diversity.  This single-minded focus will lead future 
courts, like Paynter, to divorce the racial and socioeconomic 
composition of the classroom from the definition of an adequate 
education, despite its proven effectiveness as an educational input. 
Finance litigation could also integrate schools if the remedies 
awarded included permitting aggrieved plaintiffs to attend magnet 
schools or awarding successful plaintiffs vouchers for use at private 
 
 189. Ryan, Sheff, supra note 54 at 530–31. 
 190. 765 N.Y.S.2d 819, 824 (N.Y. 2003). 
 191. Id. 
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or out of district schools.192  These alternative remedies face the same 
opposition as integration and will likely never reach beyond school 
district boundaries.  The judicial, political, and social opposition to 
integrating suburban middle-class schools means finance litigation 
will not be redirected toward integrative remedies. 
The separate schools resulting from school finance reform will 
not be equal for several reasons.  First, the poor minority districts 
that most need additional funding are the least likely to obtain it 
through finance litigation.  Only twenty-five percent of school 
districts composed of minorities were victorious in finance litigation, 
compared to a seventy-five percent victory rate when the plaintiff 
was a predominantly white school district.193  The schools most in 
need of additional resources—urban minority districts—won only 
12.5% of their cases.194  There is no reason to believe that minority 
victory rates will rise in the future. 
Even when minority districts are victorious, state legislatures 
resist court orders redistributing educational resources.  Akin to the 
South’s “massive resistance” to desegregation, many state legislatures 
evade court orders compelling them to either increase or equalize 
educational spending, often rendering finance litigation ineffective.195  
The middle-class suburban voters in well financed school districts 
effectively block educational wealth redistribution.  The twenty-five 
year fights waged by minority school districts in Texas and New 
 
 192. School voucher advocates recently filed a lawsuit in New Jersey demanding that the state 
and districts provide families of 60,000 children in 96 “failing schools” the right—and the 
money—to attend other schools of their choice, public or private.  Kristen A. Graham, Suit to Ask 
N.J. to Ease Transfers for Pupils, PHILADELPHIA ENQUIRER, July 13, 2006. In a similar, non-class 
action lawsuit, a mother sought tuition vouchers as a remedy for the state’s failure to provide her 
children an adequate education.  David J. Hoff, Education Week, January 25, 2006. 
 193. Ryan, The Influence of Race, supra note 12, at 455. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Boger, supra note 49, at 1383–84, 1454, 1458–59. 
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Jersey establish that finance “reform will be particularly difficult 
when legislatures are forced by court order to devote more resources 
primarily to minority districts.”196  The political opposition to wealth 
redistribution will likely continue unabated and prevent finance 
litigation from creating schools with equivalent financing. 
Even in states where finance litigation is successful in both the 
courts and legislature, complete equality does not result.  Not one 
single state has adopted a plan that completely equalizes spending 
through wealth redistribution.197  There is simply not enough money 
to ensure that all districts increase their spending to match the 
highest spending districts, and there is insurmountable opposition to 
capping expenditures by the wealthiest districts.198  The current 
finance reform wave—adequacy litigation—does not even address 
this inequality.  Wealthy districts can, and will, continue to outspend 
poor districts in a system that requires only sufficient funding to 
attain an adequate education.199  The adequacy wave which 
dominates finance litigation today will lead to further financial 
disparity between wealthy and poor districts. 
The recently emergent trend in finance litigation to demand 
vertical equity will not change this outcome for several reasons.  
First, it is unlikely that state legislatures will implement vertical 
equity schemes even if the theory materializes into the fourth wave of 
finance reform.  Considering the significant resistance to horizontal 
equity it is unlikely that state legislatures and the voting populace will 
 
 196. Ryan, The Influence of Race, supra note 12, at 472; see also id. at 458, 471–76. 
 197. McUsic, supra note 23, at 1349; Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2059, 2062 (“No school 
finance case has led to equalized funding among school districts in any state.”); Heise, Litigated 
Learning, supra note 47, at 2438 (finding that no finance scheme creates true equitable spending). 
 198. McUsic, supra note 23, at 1349–50 (explaining that states do a poor job of utilizing 
supplemental state funds to equalize spending); Ryan and Heise, supra note 44, at 2060–61. 
 199. Ryan and Heise, supra note 44, at 2062. 
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support allocating resources disproportionately to poor urban 
schools.  The political trend points in exactly the opposite direction, 
as the NCLB and society demand that poorly performing schools be 
penalized rather than provided additional funds.  The era of 
throwing additional money at underperforming schools has been 
replaced by strict accountability and sanctions for 
underperformance. 
The second reason vertical equity will fail to equalize educational 
opportunities for low income and minority students is that such 
funding schemes assume that increased funding leads to improved 
educational outcomes—a link that is tenuous at best.  School finance 
cases are premised on the supposition that increased funding and 
resources to poor schools will lead to better student performance.  
The courts and scholars disagree on this assumption.  The Supreme 
Court, in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, found the question of “whether 
the quality of education may be determined by the amount of money 
expended for it” to be “unsettled and disputed.”200  Four state 
supreme courts also reject the correlation while seventeen state 
courts find a direct link between expenditures and educational 
opportunity.201  Scholars also disagree.  As early as 1966, the Coleman 
Report found that increased funding has a negligible effect on 
student achievement.202  Numerous researchers since that time reach 
the same conclusion while others find a positive correlation between 
resources and student performance.203 
 
 200. 411 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1973). 
 201. For a discussion of the states which have accepted the correlation and those that have 
rejected it, see Dayton & Dupre, supra note 54, at 2379–80. 
 202. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 146. 
 203. See, e.g., Orfield, Inherently Unequal, supra note 3, at 1048 (increased money does not 
improve the education of minorities); ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHAN THERNSTROM, NO 
EXCUSES: CLOSING THE RACIAL GAP IN LEARNING at 153 (2004) (money does not improve 
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The perception is certainly that money matters, as wealthy 
districts adamantly oppose wealth redistribution or spending caps 
and poor districts adamantly fight for increased funding.  But 
practical experience in schools since the inception of the finance 
reform movement indicates that money does not matter.  Overall 
student performance in the 1990s did not improve despite per pupil 
expenditures increasing fifteen percent.204  The performance of 
students in states where finance litigation was successful, even when 
victories yielded vertical equity finance schemes, does not support 
the correlation between expenditures and improved educational 
outcomes.205 
Most importantly, increased funds do not lead to better academic 
results in racially isolated, high poverty schools.206  The pessimistic 
view of why this occurs is that high poverty urban schools are often 
“employment-regimes,” animated more by preserving jobs in the 
school system than by spending money efficiently.207  On the other 
hand, no educators are certain exactly which educational inputs lead 
to improved educational outcomes.  It is unknown if student 
 
achievement); McUsic, supra note 23, at 1353–54 (citing numerous studies finding that increased 
funding does not lead to better educational outcomes); Ryan & Saunders, supra note 83, at 475; 
Peterson & West, supra note 74, at 12 (studies show that resources and performance are not 
linked).  But see PETER SCHRAG, FINAL TEST: THE BATTLE FOR ADEQUACY IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 
(2004) (the unequal distribution of money among schools accounts for much of the achievement 
gap).  See also Dayton & Dupre, supra note 54, at 2379–80 (citing studies disagreeing on the link 
between expenses and student performance). 
 204. Peterson & West, supra note 74, at 11–12. 
 205. Saiger, supra note 71, at 1714 (explaining that finance victories have not improved 
schools); Liebman and Sabel, supra note 73, at 204 (victories that led to increased funding have 
led to little or no educational improvement); Ryan, Sheff, supra note 54, at 540 (student 
performance has not improved in states with vertical finance schemes). 
 206. Ryan, Sheff, supra note 54 at 532, 538, 541; Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, supra note 49, 
at 284–93. 
 207. Saiger, supra note 71, at 1666–68, 1705 (explaining the “employment regime” of local 
school districts and its deleterious effects on educational policy); Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, 
supra note 49, at 284, 294–95 (finding that schools in poor neighborhoods are often treated as job 
programs and patronage, not merit, dictates employment decisions). 
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performance improves with new books, higher teacher salaries, more 
security, improved transportation to school, improved facilities, new 
computers or any combination of resource inputs.  Throwing money 
at a bad school will not yield positive results unless the elusive 
question of what money should be spent on can be answered.  While 
no school system can pinpoint expenditures which improve student 
performance, high poverty schools are particularly susceptible to 
spending money unwisely.208  Whatever the underlying cause, 
increasing funds does not appear to improve student achievement 
and school finance litigation will not improve student performance 
in poor and racially isolated schools. 
The past failure of finance reform to narrow the achievement gap 
does not guarantee its future failure, but the next “wave” of finance 
litigation reform is not promising.  The current trend in finance 
litigation, to include educational outcomes as measured by 
legislatively created educational standards in the definition of an 
adequate education, provides little hope of attaining true equality.  
The NCLB makes it easy for courts in finance litigation to 
incorporate accountability principles. Because the NCLB requires 
each state to create educational standards and a means to determine 
if such standards are met, it allows future finance litigants to argue 
that schools failing to make AYP deny children their state 
constitutional right to an adequate education and to demand 
additional funding or other changes.  Courts have every incentive to 
pursue this route particularly as they begin to tire (as they did in the 
integration cases) of micromanaging state education policy by 
constantly revisiting fiscal and curricular issues.  Courts will likely 
take the easy route and refer to legislatively created educational 
 
 208. Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, supra note 49, at 294. 
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standards when defining what constitutes an adequate education 
under the state constitution. 
The merger of finance reform and standards-based 
accountability, much as integration fused with finance reform in the 
1970s, will not result in equal schools.  By tying the constitutional 
meaning of adequacy to legislatively created state educational 
standards, the accountability movement will envelop finance reform 
and liability will hinge solely on whether a school is meeting 
minimum state standards.  As discussed in the next Section, states 
are lowering and will continue to lower their educational standards 
to avoid being labeled as failing under the NCLB.  Equality cannot be 
attained by defining an adequate education with reference to 
legislatively created educational standards because these low 
standards will easily be surpassed by wealthier suburban school 
districts, while students at poor school districts will barely clear the 
low hurdle. 
Rather than expanding judicial remedies and the reach of courts 
into the educational system, finance litigation will likely follow the 
path of all previous judicial reforms in the education field; initial 
resistance, followed by adoption then frustration at inadequate 
results, followed by abandonment.209 There is no reason to believe 
finance reform will deviate from this trend.  The resistance to finance 
reform occurred in the first two decades of the movement while the 
adoption phase has been underway for the last decade and continues 
to evolve.  If history repeats itself, courts will soon tire of tinkering in 
school policy, and the public will become frustrated by the unfulfilled 
promises of finance reform.  On the other hand, finance reform has 
 
 209. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 73, at 207 (explaining that courts in finance litigation may 
follow old trend of courageous effort to reform schools followed by disheartening recognition of 
the failure of its interventions followed by a retreat to caution). 
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proven more resilient than integration, already lasting over a decade 
longer due to its strategic shift from equity to adequacy and now to 
accountability.  But the reforms required to create truly equal schools 
will be blocked by the same powerful constituency that blocked 
meaningful integration—the middle class suburbs.  In the end, “[t]he 
drive for ‘adequacy’ is bound to be seen, when someday it has played 
itself out, as only another failed education crusade.”210  At least in the 
short run, the school finance movement shows no signs of abating 
and its combined effect with the NCLB further lures education 
reform away from integration. 
B. The NCLB 
The standards based accountability movement culminating in the 
NCLB will create separate and unequal schools.  Like finance 
litigation, the NCLB makes integration appear unnecessary for 
minority academic success because of its guarantee that no child will 
be left behind.  The NCLB itself expressly rejects the goal of 
desegregation in favor of school choice and standards based 
accountability.211  It mandates that students in failing schools be 
allowed to transfer, and goes one step further by subjugating existing 
desegregation orders to the school choice remedy.212  In other words, 
districts operating under desegregation plans that prohibit freedom 
of choice plans must alter the plan to allow the school choice remedy 
under the NCLB.  By trumping desegregation orders, the NCLB 
explicitly rejects integration as the best route to equality. 
 
 210. Rothstein, supra note 148; Saiger, supra note 71, at 1711–18 (finding that courts will be 
ineffective at reforming schools through finance litigation). 
 211. CENTURY FOUNDATION TASK FORCE ON THE COMMON SCHOOL, DIVIDED WE FAIL: 
COMING TOGETHER THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 17 (2002). 
 212. 30 C.F.R. § 200.44(c).  For a thorough discussion of the school choice provisions of the 
NCLB and their interaction with desegregation orders, see Lewin, supra note 23, at 116–23. 
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NCLB proponents contend that school choice will increase racial 
and socioeconomic diversity because poor and minority students at 
failing Title I schools will choose to transfer to white and middle class 
schools that are achieving AYP.213  This is not occurring because 
parents are not exercising their school choice options under the 
NCLB.  A 2004 report by the General Accounting Office found that 
more than three million schoolchildren—overwhelmingly low-
income and minority children—were entitled to transfer, but only 
one percent of those eligible actually transferred.214  Parents may be 
unwilling to transfer their children because there are no acceptable 
schools to which to transfer.  The NCLB limits transfer to only 
 
 213. See, e.g., William Taylor, Title I as an Instrument for Achieving Desegregation and Equal 
Educational Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1751, 1755 (2003) 
 214. Alliance for School Choice, National Test Cases Filed Against Los Angeles and Compton 
School Districts Demanding Public School Transfer Options Under No Child Left Behind Act, 
March 23, 2006 (reporting that recent complaints filed by education advocacy groups allege that 
no child in Compton Unified School District transferred schools, despite less than a quarter of the 
students being proficient in English, because the district failed to notify students of their transfer 
rights); see also CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STUDIES, FROM THE CAPITAL TO THE CLASSROOM: 
YEAR 4 OF THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT vii (March 2006), available at http://www.cep-
dc.org/nclb/Year4/CEP-NCLB-Report-4.pdf (reporting that only 1.6% of students permitted to 
transfer exercised the choice option); CYNTHIA G. BROWN, CITIZEN’S COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLS: A REPORT ON STUDENT TRANSFERS UNDER THE NO CHILD 
LEFT BEHIND ACT 37 (Dianne M. Piche and William L. Taylor eds., 2004), available at 
http://www.cccr.org/choosingbetterschools.pdf (finding that in the 2003–2004 school year, only 
5.6% of transfer eligible students sought to transfer schools and only 1.7% actually transferred); 
JIMMY KIM & GAIL L. SUNDERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, DOES 
NCLB PROVIDE GOOD CHOICES FOR STUDENTS IN LOW PERFORMING SCHOOLS? (2004) available 
at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/content_storage_01/0000000b/80/30/b8/29.pdf 
(finding that the NCLB transfer provision is not widely used, does provide low-income students 
with better educational choices, and is unworkable in urban districts with many low-performing 
schools). Parents may be unable to exercise the school choice remedy because districts are making 
it difficult by failing to send statutorily-required transfer notifications, sending them late, making 
them incomplete, or discouraging transfers in the notice.  Abigail Aikens, Note, Being Choosy: An 
Analysis of Public School Choice under No Child Left Behind, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 233, 249 (2005) 
(“[S]chool choice under NCLB . . . has been unenthusiastically supported, ignored, and even 
actively discouraged.”); Ronald Brownstein, Implementing No Child Left Behind, in THE FUTURE 
OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 26, at 220–23 (school districts fail to notify parents of transfer 
rights); Peterson & West, supra note 74, at 9; Gootman, infra note 235, at 3; Juliet Williams, 
Education Advocates Sue LAUSD: Petition: Students at failing schools blocked from opting out, LA 
DAILY NEWS, March 24, 2006.  Despite these problems no states or districts have been sanctioned 
for failing to properly notify districts. 
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schools within the same district as the failing school.  Because failing 
schools are often concentrated in poor, urban areas, there may not be 
a more acceptable choice than the failing school.215  The NCLB choice 
sanctions will not result in integrated schools so long as poor families 
are unable or unwilling to exercise school choice. 
Even if choice is exercised, it will not result in integrated schools, 
because interdistrict choices are not mandated.  Because segregation 
today occurs between rather than within districts, intradistrict school 
choice alone cannot lead to more integrated schools.216  The NCLB 
directs districts, “to the extent practicable,” to establish a cooperative 
transfer agreement with higher performing neighborhood districts 
when no schools of choice are available within a student’s district.217  
While many interdistrict transfer requests have been made under this 
provision, only two districts in the entire country have transferred 
students across district lines.218 
Assuming the remote best-case scenario—that students at failing 
schools elect to transfer to an integrated and successful school within 
the district—it is unlikely the integrated school will accept the 
transfers.  Space constraints will limit the amount of movement 
within a district.  The number of children in failing schools vastly 
 
 215. Liu and Taylor, supra note 92, at 801; Aikens, supra note 214, at 249; Brownstein, supra 
note 214, at 218–19; Phillip T.K. Daniel, No Child Left Behind: The Balm of Gilead has Arrived in 
American Education, 206 EDUC. L. REP. 791, 812 (2006) (finding that children who want to 
transfer under NCLB will have few acceptable alternatives). 
 216. Goodwin Liu, Real Options for School Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at A31; Orfield, 
Inherently Unequal, supra note 3, at 1042 (segregation today exists between, not within, school 
districts). 
 217. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(11) (Supp. II 2002). 
 218. Brown, supra note 214, at 67–69; Brownstein, supra note 214, at 213–17 (finding that 
suburban schools have not been accepting transfers from children in urban schools); Liu and 
Taylor, supra note 92, at 804–05 (explaining that suburban schools will not accept transfers from 
urban schools). 
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exceeds the number of available slots in better performing schools.219  
Though the NCLB prohibits space constraint as a reason to reject 
transfer students, the regulation may be ignored as simply too 
impractical in running a school district.  Many school districts, 
including Long Beach, Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlantic City and 
Providence have already denied transfers based on lack of capacity.220 
The school choice remedy will not integrate schools, and the 
other NCLB sanctions promote segregation in several ways.  First, 
the NCLB’s sanctions create strong incentives for white, middle class 
schools to avoid integration in order to maintain AYP.221  Because 
low income and minority students perform worse than middle class 
whites on standardized tests, and because failure of a subgroup 
means the entire school fails, diverse schools are less likely than 
segregated white schools to make AYP.  White, middle class schools 
will exclude nonwhite and poor students and avoid integration 
because it brings a higher risk of sanction.222  This is already 
occurring in Connecticut, where the state education commissioner 
noted the “reluctance on the part of school districts to accept 
youngsters who come with deficiencies because they’re concerned 
 
 219. Alliance for School Choice, National Test Cases Filed Against Los Angeles and Compton 
School Districts Demanding Public School Transfer Options Under No Child Left Behind Act,supra 
note 214. 
 220. Brown, supra note 214, at 62–63. 
 221. AP, Law Raises Fears of More Segregation, April 19, 2006 (stating that the NCLB “is—
unexpectedly—encouraging school segregation”); Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 5, at 963–
64. 
 222. Kane & Staiger, supra note 126, at 152–53, 158, 160–68, 174; Aikens, supra note 214, at 
238; Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 5, at 961–62; AP, supra note 221 (a solution for schools 
to avoid the failing label “is for schools to become less diverse”); see also Daniel, supra note 215, at 
803–05 (discussing reasons why diverse schools are less likely to make AYP than predominantly 
white suburban schools). 
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that if they get enough of them . . . they’ll become labeled as failing 
schools.”223 
Second, parents will reject diverse schools because they are less 
likely to make AYP.  Parents become skeptical of the value of 
integration once test scores begin to decline, creating an incentive to 
forego diversity in order to attend a school making AYP.224  Middle 
class parents will shun diverse schools because they are more likely to 
score lower on standardized tests.  Prestigious integrated schools are 
already losing white students for this reason.225 
Most importantly, though, the NCLB will lead to segregated 
schools because it diverts the nation’s attention from integration as a 
means to achieve equal educational opportunity.  The NCLB 
“redirects educational thinking along new channels”—away from 
diversity and into academic accountability.226  School reputation was 
previously based on an array of factors, including the diversity of the 
student body, but the NCLB hinges school reputation exclusively on 
standardized test scores, cutting integration out of the equation.227  
The standards-based movement undercuts integration by acting in 
concert with the economic model of schools from finance reform to 
transform our vision of schools from institutions that convey a broad 
 
 223. AP, supra note 221. 
 224. Wells & Holme, supra note 164. 
 225. Id. at 1, 7, 13. 
 226. Peterson & West, supra note 74, at 1–2; see also Wells & Holme, supra note 164, at 1 
(“[T]he accountability movement . . . has significantly narrowed the definition of school quality in 
a way that works against racial diversity.”); Daniel, supra note 215, at 813 (describing the NCLB as 
a “balm of comfort” and a “healing salve of federal spending [that] will help mend the gap 
between the performance of all students”). 
 227. Eric A. Hanushek and Margaret E. Raymond, Lessons about the Design of State 
Accountability Systems in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 102, at 138 (“[A]ccountability 
systems focus attention on some details of performance and leave others as irrelevant.”); Ryan, 
Perverse Incentives, supra note 5, at 966 (“[The NCLB’s] emphasis on standardized test scores has 
undeniably worked to narrow perceptions of what constitutes a ‘good’ school.”). 
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spectrum of learning—from social to cultural to the three “R”s—to 
institutions that convey merely academic material.  The intergroup 
benefits of integration to all races are meaningless in a system that 
judges schools exclusively on objective measurable outcomes and 
financial inputs. 
The segregated schools created by the NCLB will inevitably be 
unequal.  The politics of school accountability virtually guarantee 
that states will reduce educational standards to ensure their schools 
make AYP.  High educational standards and accountability to ensure 
those standards are reached are appealing in the abstract and enjoy 
broad-based but dispersed political support.  But the existence of 
standards necessarily means that certain students, teachers, schools, 
and districts will not meet these standards and will consequently 
oppose the system.  As the opposition to standards-based 
accountability coalesces, the scattered support will wane.  
Legislatures will bow to these special interest groups because there is 
no concentrated pro-accountability constituency.  Frederick Hess 
concludes that all conflicts over accountability standards turn out the 
same: “Proponents . . . must marshal diffuse support in response to 
challenges from passionate, coherent constituencies.  The American 
political system is notoriously bad at pursuing collective goods when 
it requires imposing concentrated costs on select groups.”228 
The concentrated political forces opposing standards-based 
accountability are formidable.  Teachers unions pose one of the most 
powerful opponents to the NCLB, because the NCLB threatens 
teachers’ classroom autonomy, job security, and pay.229  States and 
 
 228. Hess, supra note 100, at 65; see also id. at 56 (accountability is appealing in the abstract 
but its costs are more politically salient than the diffuse long-term educational benefits). 
 229. The National Education Association, the largest teachers union, has spent over $8 
million in an effort to derail the NCLB.  Gregg Topo, Report: NEA Pays Opponents of NCLB, USA 
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school districts oppose the sweeping reforms of the NCLB, because 
they intrude on state and local control over education and increase 
education costs.  States, school districts, and teachers’ unions have 
taken their opposition to court and are seeking declaratory relief 
from the NCLB in federal courts on the grounds it is an unfunded 
mandate.230  The racial and economic communities that are 
disproportionately affected by standards-based reform will also 
mount opposition.  Poor and minority school districts will likely 
oppose the NCLB because their schools are the most likely to be 
found failing and subject to the school choice and reconstitution 
sanctions.  In the 2004–2005 school year, high-poverty schools that 
failed to make AYP jumped fifty percent, from six thousand to nine 
thousand.231  The opposition of poor and minority districts will be 
further galvanized by the recent DOE changes to the NCLB, which 
make it “harder for some districts, primarily those serving minorities, 
to make AYP.”232 
In short, the politics of accountability give “every reason to 
believe that tough, coercive accountability will gradually evolve into 
 
TODAY, July 10, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2006-07-10-nea-no-
child_x.htm; see also Peterson & West, supra note 74, at 10–11 (opposition from the powerful 
teachers’ unions threatens the accountability movement); Hochschild, supra note 97, at 112–14  
(teachers unions are opposed to standards based reforms and are one of the most powerful forces 
in American politics); Moe, supra note 23, at 90–93 (teachers’ unions oppose accountability 
reforms); Hess, supra note 100, at 61–62 (unions historically oppose any reduction in teacher 
autonomy); Nichols, supra note 38, at 175 (teachers’ unions oppose accountability because it 
introduces incentives, both positive and negative, which educational institutions were previously 
insulated from). 
 230. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Spellings, No. 3:05cv1330(MRK), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7638 (D. 
Conn. Aug. 22, 2005); School District of the City of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. 05-71535-DT (E.D. 
Mich. Nov. 23, 2005).  For a general discussion of state and local school district opposition to the 
NCLB, see Daniel, supra note 207, at 797–801. 
 231. Diana Jean Schemo, 20 States Ask for Flexibility in School Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 22, 2006. 
 232. Sunderman, supra note 75, at 10. 
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something softer, nicer, more acceptable to those directly affected.”233  
This has proven true in the past and under current NCLB practice.  
States historically “dumb down” their standards when faced with too 
many failing students.234  For example, in the 1970s thirty-six states 
adopted Minimum Competency Testing (MCT) to assess students’ 
basic skills, and eighteen states conditioned graduation on passing 
exams.235  The legislation passed with ease, but met stringent 
opposition when students began to fail.236  In response to the political 
pressure from concentrated interests with significant stakes, passing 
rates were boosted by making exams easier, setting the bar low for 
passage, giving multiple chances to pass exams, and exempting 
categories of low performing students.237  Rather than actually 
improving educational institutions, the system was “gamed” to create 
the appearance of improvement.  States that adopted accountability 
measures in the 1990s went through the same progression: high 
standards at first followed by lower standards to mollify the coalesced 
opposition.  By 2000, one-third of all states adopting high stakes 
testing for students slowed or scaled back their original efforts in the 
face of political opposition. 238 
History is repeating itself under the NCLB.  Because the NCLB 
leaves states significant discretion in setting their “challenging” 
academic standards, designing tests, and defining what constitutes a 
passing score, there is significant opportunity to game the system.  
 
 233. Peterson and West, supra note 74, at 12; see also id. at 19 (“If the past is any guide to 
what will happen in the next few years, softer forms of accountability are likely to be the norm.”). 
 234. Id. at 8–10; Moran, supra note 38, at 167. 
 235. Thomas S. Dee, The "First Wave" of Accountability, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?  THE 
POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 217 (Paul E. Peterson and Martin R. West 
eds.) (2003). 
 236. Hess, supra note 100, at 70. 
 237. Dee, supra note 235, at 217, 234; Hess, supra note 100, at 69–70. 
 238. Hess, supra note 100, at 55–56, 60. 
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States are already diluting their minimum competency standards to 
avoid having their schools labeled as failing.239  Gail Sunderman’s 
recent survey of amendments made by states to their NCLB 
implementation plans concludes that “[m]any of the changes simply 
reduced the number of schools and districts identified for 
improvement, but without requiring any educational 
improvement.”240  For example, Michigan reduced its AYP cutoff 
from a seventy-five percent passage rate to a forty-two percent 
passage rate thereby reducing its number of failing schools from one 
thousand five hundred thirteen to two hundred sixteen in one fell 
swoop.241  In 2006, twenty states requested that they be allowed to 
alter the means by which they measure student progress, i.e. to count 
students as proficient even though they are not. 242  The Department 
of Education has approved many state amendments “to respond to 
the growing state opposition to the law by providing relief from some 
of the law’s provisions and reducing, at least temporarily, the number 
of schools and districts identified for improvement.”243 
States are also avoiding the failure label by not reporting the test 
scores of students in subgroups that are unlikely to score well on 
standardized tests.  Schools need only report subgroup test scores if 
 
 239. Moore, supra note 123, at 198; Lance D. Fusarelli, The Potential Impact of the No Child 
Left Behind Act on Equity and Diversity in American Education, 18 EDUC. POL’Y 71, 82 (2004) 
(Ohio, Louisiana, Michigan, Texas and Arizona have already reduced test score standards); Lynn 
Olson, Requests Win More Leeway Under NCLB, EDUC. WEEK, July 13, 2005 (identifying states 
requesting changes to accountability plans). 
 240. Sunderman, supra note 75, at 10, 11.  See also id. at 7 (“[T]he federal government is 
“permitting a wide variety of changes that lower the failure rate.”). 
 241. Fusarelli, supra note 239, at 82. 
 242. Schemo, supra note 137. 
 243. Sunderman, supra note 75, at 9. Id. at 52 (finding that the DOE loosened accountability 
requirements in response to state and local opposition to NCLB); see also Liebman and Sabel, 
supra note 73, at 286–87 (the DOE has relaxed, not stiffened, the monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms of the NCLB, which follows the DOE’s tradition of lax enforcement of federal 
education requirements). 
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there are sufficient numbers of students in the subgroup to yield 
“statistically reliable information.”244  States retain great latitude in 
determining the magic number of students that comprises a 
subgroup.  Because failure in any subgroup means the entire school 
fails, there are strong incentives for schools to reduce the number of 
subgroups.  Nearly two dozen states have petitioned the federal 
government for exemptions to exclude larger numbers of students in 
racial subgroups, allowing them to avoid racial subgroup breakdowns 
even when they have up to fifty students of a given race in a testing 
population.245  A recent AP study found that nearly two million 
students’ test scores are not being counted under racial subgroups 
and that minorities are seven times more likely to have their scores 
excluded than whites.246 
In summary, states and schools are “gaming” the system by 
changing their standards and assessment methods to ensure that they 
make AYP instead of making meaningful institutional changes to 
improve the education of all students.247  This ensures that the 
 
 244. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II), (b)(3)(C)(xiii) (2006). 
 245. AP, No Child Loophole Misses Millions of Scores, April 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2006.EDUCATION/04/18/no.child.loophole.ap/index.html.  In Oklahoma, 
for example, schools may exclude the test scores from any racial subgroup with 52 or fewer 
members in the testing population, meaning 1 in 5 children in the state do not have scores broken 
out by race.  Id. 
 246. Id.  While less than 2% of white children’s scores aren’t being counted as a separate 
category, Hispanics and blacks have roughly 10% of their scores excluded.  Id.  See also 
Sunderman, supra note 75, at 7. 
 247. Sunderman, supra note 75, at 7 (“safe harbor” provisions have been expanded and 
statistics establishing progress have become increasingly complex , all of which lower the number 
of apparent failures).  See also id. at 52 (“The combination of statistical techniques that can now 
be used to calculate AYP add complexity to the states’ accountability systems and complicates 
understanding of what AYP accountability means.”); AP, supra note 245 (schools are “asking the 
question, not how to we generate statistically reliable results, but how do we generate politically 
palatable results.”); Moore, supra note 123, at 197–98 (identifying methods by which states, 
schools and teachers are gaming the system); Daniel, supra note 215, at 808–10 (discussing 
“nefarious” means by which states and districts avoid NCLB sanctions without improving 
schools); Joyce Howard Price, Student Pool Manipulated for Tests, Report Finds, THE 
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schools make AYP, but the wealthy and middle-class white suburban 
schools will be far surpassing the low academic requirements while 
poor and minority urban schools will barely achieve minimum 
proficiency.  This is the epitome of separate and unequal schools and 
a haunting reminder of de Tocqueville’s prediction that the price of 
equality in a democratic society can be mediocrity.248 
The NCLB schools of the future, while guaranteeing that no child 
will be left behind, do not guarantee that all children will receive 
equal educational opportunity.  The Act virtually ensures that white, 
middle-class, suburban schools will remain racially isolated and will 
continue to provide superior teachers and educations to their 
students in comparison to poor urban minority schools.249  Rather 
than narrow the achievement gap, the NCLB will “exacerbate 
inequalities among communities and their schools and students” by 
redistributing rewards to schools that test well.250 
While the short term trends of the accountability movement yield 
separate and unequal schools, changes could be made to avoid this 
long-term outcome.  Congress could amend the NCLB to remove 
state discretion over setting educational standards.  Currently, there 
is no objective check on state accountability measures and 
educational standards, making it difficult to ascertain if state 
 
WASHINGTON TIMES, June 26, 2006, available at  http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060613-
110558-2154r.html (reporting that in Florida schools disproportionately suspended the weakest 
performing students just before scheduled standardized testing to ensure fewer of those students 
would take the tests and lower the schools score). 
 248. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 628–32 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence Trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835). 
 249. The NCLB will lead the best teachers to go to the best schools where they are least 
needed.  Boger, supra note 49, at 1445, 1448.  This phenomenon occurred in California where the 
accountability movement widened the gap in teacher education, experience, and credentials 
between passing and failing schools.  Julian R. Betts and Anne Danenberg, The Effects of 
Accountability in California, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 74, at  198–99, 209–10. 
 250. Moore, supra note 123, at 201.  See also id. at 181 (“[The NCLB] is the free market model 
of education and school choice at its financial meanest.”). 
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standards are meaningful.  President Bush initially pushed for states 
to participate in the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP), a national standardized assessment tool, and to judge 
schools based on their students’ NAEP performance.251  This idea was 
compromised to allow states to biennially participate in NAEP 
testing in fourth and eighth grade but without any penalty for 
schools failing to show improvement.  There are currently no 
consequences if schools fail to improve performance on the NAEP.252  
If accountability was tied to the nationally standardized NAEP, states 
could not decrease their number of failing schools by merely 
reducing state educational standards.  This future appears unlikely, as 
enforcement of the NCLB by the DOE shows a willingness to defer 
more to the states rather than push nationalized standards.  The 
political pressures that push states to lower standards in the first 
place will prevent application of national standards. 
The accountability reform trend will likely follow the path of 
previous legal education reforms.  The initial resistance to 
accountability in the 1980s and 1990s is now yielding to significant 
effort to push these reforms through the NCLB.  Frustration will 
soon set in unless accountability quickly achieves its promised 
results.  Because the NCLB will not reduce the minority achievement 
gap, abandonment rather than retrenchment will follow.  On the 
other hand, accountability has the potential to evolve differently than 
integration and finance reform, because it is not as vehemently 
opposed by the middle class suburbs.  The NCLB reforms appear 
virtually cost free to the suburban middle-class, because the Act does 
not require them to open their doors or redistribute their property 
 
 251. Goodwin Liu, Interstate Equality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2044, 
2107–08 (Dec. 2006) 
 252. Rudalevige, supra note 74, at 41–42. 
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wealth to poor and minority students, which were insurmountable 
obstacles in the finance and integration movements.  It allows the 
middle class to feel that something is being done to help the poor and 
minorities, but not at the expense of their schools.  The NCLB 
focuses sanctions directly at failing schools (typically poor, urban, 
minority schools), which is where the middle class believe the 
problem resides and where sole responsibility should lie.  But as long 
as suburban schools are absolved of responsibility for urban schools 
and exempted from the school choice, and as long as concentrated 
political interests oppose high standards, the NCLB will lead to 
separate and unequal schools. 
C. School Choice 
Because school choice is still in its formative years, it lacks a 
cohesive identity and direction, making its evolution difficult to 
predict.  Certain choice initiatives such as magnet schools and open 
enrollment have existed for decades, but the infusion of vouchers and 
charter schools changed the purpose of school choice from 
integration to improving underperforming schools through 
competition.  The short history of choice as a civil rights initiative is 
difficult to extrapolate into an accurate prediction of its prospects.  
The critical question for the choice movement is whether the liberty 
inherent in school selection will provide an adequate remedy for 
inequality. 
Because school choice is based on market driven competition, its 
effectiveness can be judged on supply and demand principles.  
Competition will improve public schools only if there is a broad 
supply, or market, of schools from which parents can choose, and 
there is a demand for such schools; i.e., parents actually exercise 
choice.  If the scope of school choice is narrow, there will be little 
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competitive pressure on public schools to improve.253  Likewise, 
limited demand for school choice by parents means public schools do 
not need to improve to retain students.  The potential of school 
choice to improve the plight of minority students has not, and will 
not, come close to being achieved because both the supply and 
demand for school choice are and will be circumscribed. 
The supply of school choice alternatives is limited, because strong 
and unusual political alliances have aligned to prevent a large school 
choice market from developing.  Conservatives, particularly religious 
conservatives, support expanding choice through vouchers despite its 
significant departure from the status quo.  Poor and minorities also 
support choice despite its racist heritage.  On the other hand, 
teachers’ unions, civil liberty groups, and liberals oppose school 
choice measures in favor of the status quo system.254  Most 
importantly, middle class families seek to narrow choice to avoid 
threatening their community schools.  Middle class parents see no 
need to increase educational options when they are satisfied with 
their schools and worry that choice may lead to an infusion of poor 
or minority students into their schools.  The political opposition to 
this point has effectively limited most choice plans—whether 
through vouchers, charter schools, open enrollment, or magnet 
schools—to allow only intradistrict choice for low income and 
minority students.255 
 
 253. Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2103, 2108, 2112–15; Forman, supra note 26, at 1318–19. 
 254. Berkowitz, supra note 95, at 108 (discussing the political proponents and opponents of 
school choice); Moe, supra note 26, at 149 (same); Peterson, supra note 96, at 19 (blacks support 
vouchers more than whites: 72% compared to 59%). 
 255. Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2045, 2063, 2087.  See also Liu & Taylor, supra note 92, at 
803 (“[S]uburbanites have exercised ‘local control’ to insulate their neighborhood schools racially 
and socioeconomically.”); id. at 804 (“suburban taxpayers are wary of spending their local tax 
dollars on the education of nonresidents.”); id. at 814–15 (middle-class voters generally oppose 
vouchers). 
01__GARDA.DOC 11/1/2007  3:48:37 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 76 ? 
If choice continues to be limited to schools within a district and 
not across district lines, racial and socioeconomic isolation will 
persist into the future.256  This will likely occur, considering the 
staying power and past victory rates of the opposition and that 
proponents do not support choice because of its integrative potential.  
Low income and minority students simply want an escape hatch 
from dismal schools, the religious right wants nonsectarian choices, 
and conservatives want only limited market pressure to bear on 
underperforming schools.  No effort has been made by proponents 
or opponents to mold choice to advance integration and none should 
be expected.257 
The narrow demand for school choice also limits its effectiveness.  
Less than two percent of students eligible for choice under the NCLB 
exercised their transfer right.  Charter schools serve less than five 
percent of the overall student population, and voucher programs 
serve only a fraction of a percentage of American students.258  The 
limited demand may be a product of limited choice.  If parents’ 
choice is narrowed to only intradistrict public schools or inexpensive 
private schools, there is little reason for parents and students to 
undergo the effort of leaving the neighborhood school.  But the 
limited demand for choice may also be a product of non-educational 
factors.  Parents may not exercise school choice even when better 
schools are offered because of the strong ties to the neighborhood 
school, the convenience of the neighborhood school, the 
unwillingness to send their children on long bus rides, the 
unwillingness of the child to leave friends and transfer to a new 
environment, or any number of non-academic related factors.  In 
 
 256. Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2048, 2100. 
 257. Id. at 2089. 
 258. Moe, supra note 26, at 149. 
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short, broadening school choices may not lead to a concomitant rise 
in demand for such choices and limited demand may inhibit the 
effectiveness of school choice. 
Assuming the school choice market can be expanded and the 
demand for choice increases markedly, many scholars conclude that 
school choice will result in further stratification of schools by class 
and race.259  The preferences of the American people drive 
segregation at this point, not state sponsored separation, and choice 
will only lead to further segregation.  As Erika Frankenberg and 
Chungmei Lee explain, “normal outcomes of markets when applied 
to a racially stratified society is a perpetuation of racial 
stratification.”260  This certainly occurred in the post-Brown freedom 
of choice era and may likely be the fate of charter schools and 
voucher programs. 
1. Vouchers 
Vouchers are the most controversial freedom of choice reform 
because of their potential to change the face of education from 
publicly provided to only publicly funded.  Whether vouchers can 
remedy the inequality between white and nonwhite students hinges 
 
 259. See, e.g., Robert Wrinkle et al., Public School Quality, Private Schools and Race, 43 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 1248, 1248–53 (1999) (school choice will have segregative effects); Joseph R. McKinney, 
Public School Choice and Desegregation: A Reality Check, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 649, 657 (1996) (school 
choice and desegregation will continue to prove mutually exclusive into the future); MICHAEL 
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 218 (1983) (parental choice leads to less diversity); National 
Working Commission on Choice in K-12 Education, School Choice:  Doing it the Right Way 
makes a Difference, 16–17 (The Brown Center on Education Policy, The Brookings Institution ed., 
2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/gs/brown/20031116schoolchoicereport.pdf (noting 
the adverse effect increased competition can have on the poorest families); Helen Hershkoff & 
Adam S. Cohen, School Choice and the Lessons of Choctaw County, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 28 
(1992) (the ability of schools to maintain a majority white student body shows discrimination 
continues).  But see Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, supra note 49, at 311–12 (suggesting school 
choice done properly could lead to integration in the future) and Ryan, Suburban Veto, supra note 
166, at 1644 (arguing that school choice, if limited by racial considerations, may be one of the only 
means left for integration). 
 260. Frankenberg & Lee, supra note 172, at 5. 
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on whether the use of vouchers will grow in the future and, if so, 
whether they will improve educational opportunity for minorities. 
Voucher programs cannot remedy educational inequality unless 
they experience tremendous growth.  The small percentage of 
students currently served by voucher programs cannot exert 
sufficient market pressures for schools to improve and provides few 
escape opportunities for poor and minority students.  But the 
privatization of education through the use of vouchers has not 
exploded as expected.261  Vouchers remain unpopular with the 
American public, and voucher proposals almost always lose at the 
polls, usually by wide margins.262  Americans simply may not be 
willing to abandon a public school system they have trusted for 
decades.  Legal, political, and market factors will likely prevent the 
rapid growth of voucher programs necessary to make them an 
effective competitor to public schools. 
Powerful political interest groups will continue to blunt the 
growth of vouchers.  By introducing competition for students and 
the state funds that accompany them, vouchers threaten teacher and 
administrator job security and pay and are necessarily opposed by 
teachers’ unions and public schools.263  The education establishment, 
with vested interests in maintaining the status quo, will exert its 
considerable political clout to protect its turf.264  In the short run, 
 
 261. Saiger, supra note 71, at 1673. 
 262. Id. at 1672; Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2079–82.  See also Moe, supra note 26, at 145 
(vouchers lose at the polls because of a lack of familiarity amongst voters and the highly complex 
issues involved). 
 263. Dillon, supra note 135, at 8 (teachers unions strongly oppose vouchers because they 
introduce competition into the previously insulated public school system and they divert public 
funds into private schools which have little to no accountability to the state); Moe, supra note 26, 
at 138 (vouchers take students and money with them to private schools, thus hurting the union by 
removing money that would otherwise go toward job security and teacher salary). 
 264. Moe, supra note 26, at 141–42; Dillon, supra note 135, at 8. 
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therefore, vouchers do not appear poised to explode onto the scene 
and achieve universality.  Overcoming the political clout of the 
education establishment and quelling Americans’ trepidation of 
abandoning public education will likely not occur, if ever, for at least 
twenty to thirty years.265 
Even if vouchers find favor in state legislatures, they may be 
blocked by the judiciary.  While Zelman removed the Establishment 
Clause cloud that inhibited the growth of vouchers for three decades, 
state constitutions still present a significant legal hurdle to the 
expansion of vouchers.  Forty-seven state constitutions contain 
religious establishment provisions that are more explicit than the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.266  Blaine 
amendments, which specifically prohibit government aide to 
sectarian schools, and compelled support provisions, which prohibit 
states from compelling their citizens to support religion, may render 
broad voucher programs infirm under state constitutions.267 
The education articles of state constitutions also present an 
obstacle to voucher programs.  In 2004, the Colorado Supreme Court 
held that the state voucher program violated the local control 
provisions of the state constitution, because the state voucher law 
usurped district discretion over how to spend educational monies.268  
While only six other states have similar local control provisions, the 
case exemplifies how vouchers may run afoul of a myriad of state 
 
 265. Moe, supra note 26, at 151–52, 154–55; Liu & Taylor, supra note 92, at 817. 
 266. Bolick, supra note 95, at 57, 80–81; Green, supra note 98, at 50–51; Louis R. Cohen & C. 
Boyden Gray, The Need for Secular Choice, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 26, at 
96. 
 267. For a discussion of Blaine amendment decisions, see Cohen & Gray, supra note 266, at 
101–04 (tracing history of Blaine amendment decisions).  See also Saiger, supra note 71, at 1672 
(discussing state constitution barriers to voucher programs). 
 268. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers and Students, 92 P.3d 933 (Colo. 2004). 
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constitutional provisions.269  Vouchers may even violate educational 
adequacy clauses, which are present in most state constitutions.  For 
example, in 2006 the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida’s 
opportunity scholarship program—the first statewide program in the 
nation—violated the state constitutional guarantee of a uniform 
system of free public schools.270  Whether the Florida high court 
decision is trend-setting or an anomaly is yet unknown, it still casts a 
cloud over efforts to institute vouchers on a widespread basis. 
Market forces may also inhibit the growth of vouchers.  The 
private school choice movement can only occur if there are in fact 
private schools to accept voucher students.  As Brian Hassel explains, 
existing private schools are wary of accepting voucher students 
because they arrive with too many state-regulated strings attached, 
such as accountability measures and altered admission standards.271  
As a result, many new private schools will have to be formed to meet 
any future voucher demand, but forming a new private school is 
costly and difficult.  If vouchers ever do take off, their effectiveness 
will be blunted by a dearth of private schools willing to accept 
voucher students.272  Because of these legal, political, and market 
obstacles, it is unlikely vouchers will expand to produce sufficient 
market pressure for public schools to improve or to provide a 
significant number of students a means to escape underperforming 
schools.273 
 
 269. Id. at 939. 
 270. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 405–12 (Fla. 2006). 
 271. Bryan Hassel, The Future of Charter Schools in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra 
note 26, at 187. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Liu & Taylor, supra note 92, at 814–17. 
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If voucher programs traverse the political, legal, and market 
roadblocks, it is difficult to forecast whether their widespread use 
would yield integrated schools or improved educational 
opportunities for minorities.  Properly constituted voucher programs 
can be used to further integration.  Considering that all current 
voucher programs target poor and minority students, most of which 
attend highly segregated schools, it is logical to assume that voucher 
students will choose to move to more integrated schools.  So long as 
vouchers remain available only for the poor and minorities, modest 
desegregative effects can be expected.274  But modern voucher 
programs are not designed to integrate students by making poor 
urban minorities attractive to middle class white schools because the 
amount of the vouchers are too low.  “[I]nstead, [modern voucher 
programs] assume that inner-city students will continue to go to 
school with others of their same race and class background.  The only 
change is the type of school, not the composition of the student 
body.”275  It is for these reasons that vouchers have had little to no 
effect on integration and may in fact lead to the resegregation of 
urban schools, as occurred in Milwaukee.276  Unless interdistrict 
 
 274. See, e.g., id. at 807 (arguing that voucher programs targeted at poor and minorities have 
led to modest integration in urban centers); id. at 813 (all voucher programs are currently targeted 
at educationally disadvantaged youth); John Tierney, Black Students Lose Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
7, 2006, at A11 (citing studies showing that vouchers lead to integration); Ryan & Heise, supra 
note 44, at 2097 (vouchers lead to minimal improvement in integration because students from 
segregated urban schools go to more fully integrated private schools). 
 275. Forman, supra note 26, at 1315.  See also Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2085 (much of 
the support for vouchers is not intended to achieve racial balancing or integrated schools); Liu & 
Taylor, supra note 92, at 807–08 (modest voucher payments are preventing integration). 
 276. See, e.g., Alexander & Alexander, supra note 26, at 1135 (vouchers will lead to “the 
proliferation of private segregated academies, and the balkanization and racial resegregation of 
American education with the government’s help”); id at 1152 (predicting an “exodus of students 
from integrated public schools to segregated private schools as tuition voucher programs and 
similar incentives are enacted at the state and federal levels”).  Several studies conclude that 
voucher programs resegregate schools.  See, e.g., Frank R. Kemerer, The Legal Status of 
Privatization and Vouchers in Education, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION: CAN THE MARKETPLACE 
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limitations are eliminated and vouchers are valuable enough to 
encourage suburban schools to accept voucher students, voucher 
programs represent merely another attempt to make separate but 
equal schools.277 
The racially separate voucher schools of the future, if they 
materialize, at least hold promise for equality (or at least the “most” 
equality that can be achieved in separate schools).  There is great 
disagreement as to whether voucher students perform better in 
private schools.278  Studies of the Milwaukee program have reached 
varied conclusions.279  The most comprehensive study, conducted by 
Paul Peterson and William Howell, showed that black voucher 
students performed better in private schools.280  Analyzing the 
 
DELIVER CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL COHESION? 55–59 (Henry M. Levin ed., 
2001) (privatization may make racial isolation of schools even worse); Evan Thomas & Lynette 
Clemetson, A New War Over Vouchers: Poor Parents Want Them But Civil Rights Leaders Are 
Split, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 1999, at 46 (arguing that vouchers can have an adverse effect on the 
racial integration of schools); Forman, supra note 26, at 1316–17 (claiming vouchers create de 
facto segregation).  Contrastingly, other scholars conclude that vouchers will have little to no 
impact on integration.  See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Racial Segregation in American Churches and 
its Implications for School Vouchers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 193, 228–29 (2001) (“[T]he relevance of 
geographical preferences to a voucher program in a city with highly segregated neighborhoods, 
rather, is that they appear to effectively negate any integrative tendencies arising from increased 
student mobility which vouchers are said to facilitate.”); BRIAN GILL, ET AL., RHETORIC V. 
REALITY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT VOUCHERS AND CHARTER 
SCHOOLS 164–68 (2001) (available evidence suggests that students under voucher programs move 
to schools which are only slightly more integrated). 
 277. Forman, supra note 26, at 1316. 
 278. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Report Defends Vouchers but Fails to Quell Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 
13, 2003, at A29 (describing disputes in methodologies of studies used to measure the success of 
voucher programs); Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2110–11 (citing conflicting results in 
numerous studies). 
 279. Compare John F. Witte, The Milwaukee Voucher Experiment, 20 EDUCATIONAL 
EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS 229–51 (Winter 1998); with Jay P. Green et al., Effectiveness 
of School Choice: The Milwaukee Experiment, 31 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY 190–213 (Feb. 
1999); and CECILIA ROUSE, PRIVATE SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: AN 
EVALUATION OF THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAMS (1997). 
 280. Dillon, supra note 278, at 29.  See also Peterson, supra note 95, at 12–13 (African-
American students perform better in private schools); Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2111 (most 
research shows modest improvement for African-Americans in private schools); Dillon, supra 
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identical data, however, other researchers concluded that African 
Americans in private schools showed minimal or no gain.281  The 
United States Department of Education recently completed a 
comprehensive study concluding that when students of like 
economic, racial, and family backgrounds were compared, public 
school students did as well as or better than those in private school in 
fourth grade reading and math and in eighth grade math.  The 
private school students performed better only on eighth grade 
reading tests.282 
Because voucher programs are in their formative years, it is 
difficult to determine if they will increase racial and socioeconomic 
isolation or improve minority educational performance.  Without 
knowing the answers to these questions it is not prudent to rely on 
vouchers to remedy the current educational inequity.  They hold 
promise, but their extremely limited implementation to date makes 
them a poor reform on which to pin the hopes of minority and low 
income students. 
2. Charter Schools 
Charter schools are more likely than voucher programs to 
dominate the choice movement of the future.  They enjoy strong 
public support, because they represent the middle ground between 
complete privatization and maintaining the status quo.283  Charter 
schools achieve the competitive benefits of choice without sacrificing 
the egalitarianism of public education, making it a popular reform.  
 
note 135, at 8 (African-American voucher students in Cleveland improved their academic 
performance). 
 281. Michael Winerip, On Education: What Some Much-Needed Data Really Showed About 
Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2003, at B12. 
 282. Diane Jean Schemo, Public Schools Close to Private in U.S. Study, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
2006, at A1. 
 283. Dillon, supra note 135, at 8. 
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Middle-class suburbanites are ambivalent to charter schools, because 
their neighborhood schools typically serve them well and they favor 
initiatives that promise to improve urban educational opportunities 
without affecting their schools or wallets.284  The meteoric rise of 
charter schools in the 1990s established their resistance to even 
institutional opposition from public schools and teachers’ unions.  
While the double digit growth of charter schools in the 1990s 
recently plateaued, the restructuring sanctions of the NCLB will soon 
kick-in and the number of charter schools should again rise.285  
Charter schools appear poised to predominate academic reform for 
the next decade. 
But charter schools do not provide an adequate remedy for the 
inequality resulting from racial and socioeconomic isolation.  While 
the charter school movement is just over a decade old, the early 
returns indicate that it will produce separate and unequal schools.  
Scholars have long worried that charter schools will increase racial 
and socioeconomic isolation in schools.286  A 2003 study by the 
Harvard Civil Rights Project concluded that charter schools are more 
 
 284. Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2077. 
 285. Hassel, supra note 271, at 190–98 (the growth in charter schools is plateauing because 
statutory caps prohibit their creation and the supply of willing organizers is shrinking) 
 286. Amy Stuart Wells et al., Charter Schools and Racial and Social Class Segregation: Yet 
Another Sorting Machine?, in A NOTION AT RISK: PRESERVING PUBLIC EDUCATION AS AN ENGINE 
FOR SOCIAL MOBILITY 169, 215 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2000) (charter schools may serve as 
refuges for white flight); Lawrence, supra note 51, at 1388; GERALD W. BRACEY, THE WAR 
AGAINST AMERICAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS: PRIVATIZING SCHOOLS, COMMERCIALIZING EDUCATION 
76–79 (2002) (charter schools will lead to resegregation); KEVIN B. SMITH & KENNETH J. MEIER, 
THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE: POLITICS, MARKETS AND FOOLS 67 (school choice and 
charter schools may increase segregation); Martha Minnow, Lecture, Reforming School Reform, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 283 (1999) (arguing that charter school movement and vouchers will 
increase racial and ethnic segregation in schools); Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race and 
Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563, 600–07 (2001) (charter schools will lead to further 
segregation). 
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racially isolated than public schools.287  Over seventy percent of black 
charter school students attend intensely segregated minority schools 
compared to only thirty-four percent of black public school 
students.288  The study concluded that “[t]he charter school law was a 
movement backward to the unregulated choice policies common 40 
years ago across the South and in many big cities.  Those did not 
work to produce integration and charter school policies do not 
either.”289  The segregative impact of charter schools is so acute that 
eleven states include racial balancing requirements in their charter 
school enabling legislation.290 
Charter schools are racially and socioeconomically isolated, 
because they typically enroll only students from their home districts.  
The charter movement is principally aimed at serving disadvantaged 
students, hence most charter schools exist in urban school districts 
where minorities are highly concentrated by race and class.291  And, 
like most public schools, charter schools usually do not allow 
students from other school districts to enroll, thus limiting 
interdistrict choice for students.292  Charter schools cannot lead to 
 
 287. Frankenberg & Lee, supra note 172, at 2, 7–8, 25, 47.  See also id. at 6 (too many charter 
schools are separate and unequal); Wells, supra note 286, at 191–99 (charter schools are typically 
less racially integrated than neighboring public schools). 
 288. Frankenberg & Lee, supra note 172, at 7. 
 289. Id. at 5.  See also Wells, supra note 286, at 202 (“[C]harter schools are more extreme in 
terms of racial and social class isolation and segregation than the districts in which they are 
located.”).  But see Berkowitz, supra note 95, at 118 (generally charter schools provide more 
diversity than public schools in the same area). 
 290. Gajendragadkar, supra note 74, at 145. 
 291. Press Release, The Center for Education Reform, Charter Schools Succeed Where Others 
Fail: Serve More At-Risk and Minority Students, and Boost Achievement (March 16, 2006), 
available at http://www.edreform.com/index.cfm?fuseAction=document&documentID=2355& 
sectionID=5&NEWSYEAR=2006 (charter schools have a 60 percent median minority population 
and a median 63 percent qualifying for free/reduced lunch); Liu & Taylor, supra note 92, at 801; 
Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2076. 
 292. Liu & Taylor, supra note 92, at 802–03; Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2075–78. 
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integration so long as there are few charter schools outside of urban 
areas and enrollment is limited to intradistrict students.  While the 
first hurdle may dissolve, the second is likely permanent. 
The charter school movement may very well sweep into the 
suburbs.  Some suburban schools will be subject to the restructuring 
sanctions of the NCLB, even under watered-down state standards, 
and elect to charter their schools.  Many more might voluntarily 
create charter schools after the NCLB firmly endorsed them as a 
means to improve education.  But suburban charter schools are 
unlikely to open their doors to the urban poor and minorities.  
Suburban public schools were insulated from integration and there is 
no reason to believe suburban charter schools will follow a different 
path.  Successful constitutional challenges have already been 
mounted against statutes requiring racial balancing in charter 
schools because they are not narrowly tailored under Grutter’s strict 
scrutiny analysis.293  Political opposition alone, even without court 
assistance, may be sufficient to close the backdoor to charter school 
integration that Grutter left open by holding that diversity is a 
compelling governmental interest. 
The racially isolated charter schools of the future are unlikely to 
provide minorities an equal educational opportunity.  Researchers 
are divided as to whether charter schools outperform traditional 
public schools.294  It is difficult to compare charter schools to public 
schools because they have varied educational approaches and draw 
 
 293. Gajendragadkar, supra note 74, at 145, 157–60 (discussing constitutionality of eleven 
state charter balancing statutes). 
 294. Compare The Center for Education Reform, Charter Schools Get High Marks, available at 
http://edreform.com/_upload/charter_achievement.pdf (concluding that charter schools 
outperform public schools) with  Jennifer Mrozowski, High Promises, Lagging Results, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 29, 2005, at A1 (citing studies showing that public schools 
outperform charter schools). 
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their enrollment in different ways.  Considering that charter schools 
typically enroll at-risk minority and poor students and that scores 
tend to dip when a child attends a new school, comparison of charter 
school student performance to public school student performance is 
a comparison of oranges to apples.295  This admittedly unfair 
comparison shows that public schools outperformed charter schools 
on the 2003 NAEP.  Charter schools performed even worse when the 
data was broken down by race, ethnicity and socioeconomic status.296  
Charter schools also disproportionately fail to make AYP under the 
NCLB.297  In 2004, eighty charter schools were closed by states 
because of poor performance or questionable financial dealings.298  
On the other hand, charter schools are only now coming of age, and 
they at least hold promise for improving educational outcomes for 
disadvantaged students.  But as long as charter schools remain 
racially divided, they too cannot remedy educational inequality. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Education reform has come full circle, from “separate but equal” 
to “separate and unequal” schools.  The desegregation path to equal 
educational opportunity for minorities promulgated by Brown was 
but a short detour from the separate but equal path of Plessey.  The 
new separate but equal route eliminates de jure discrimination and 
includes outcome equality and school choice, but these new 
 
 295. Loveless, supra note 98, at 184–89. 
 296. Diana Jean Schemo, Charter Schools Trail in Results, U.S. Data Reveals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 
17, 2004, at A1; Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2109–10. 
 297. Loveless, supra note 98, at 181–83, 189–90.  In Ohio alone, more than one-half of the 112 
charter schools rated by the state received the lowest rating.  Mrozowski, supra note 294, at 1.  
However, it is important to note that Ohio charter legislation permits charter schools to open only 
in the lowest performing districts. 
 298. Schemo, supra note 296, at 1. 
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innovations make little difference to low income and minority 
students, and separate schools will again prove to be inherently 
unequal into the future. 
The segregated schools of today are accepted, and often 
embraced, for several reasons.  Because Brown eliminated de jure 
segregation and its accompanying badge of inferiority for minorities, 
school segregation slowly shed its moral and social repugnance.  The 
racial separation resulting from residential choice protected in 
Milliken became socially and morally acceptable soon thereafter.  
Minority leaders soon embraced separation as the best means to 
reclaim control over their schools and improve opportunity for their 
children, further excusing society from seeking integration.299  
Current belief is that if racial groups choose separation then 
segregated schools need not be inherently unequal.  Yet, society fails 
to recognize that segregation is not entirely the result of private, 
voluntary and free choice.  The de facto segregation of today is 
simply the “branch” that grew from the “root” of de jure 
segregation.300 
Racial and socioeconomic isolation in schools is also accepted 
because equality now appears to be real instead of Plessey’s feigned 
equality.  It is believed that true equality can be achieved under a 
“separate but equal” route that failed before, because outcome 
 
 299. Levit, supra note 90, at 500.  For example, the recent split in the Omaha school district 
along racial lines was supported by Nebraska’s only black senator, who said that black students 
“would receive a better education if they had more control over their district.”  AP, Omaha School 
District to Split Along Racial Lines, April 13, 2006, available at 
http://www.msnbc.com/id/12307173/. 
 300. Orfield, Inherently Unequal, supra note 3, at 1041–42 (discussing how housing 
segregation prevents meaningful residential choice by minorities); McUsic, supra note 23, at 
1365–66 (concluding that schools are not segregated because of private choice but instead because 
of segregation in housing caused in part by zoning and other institutionalized causes of 
segregation). 
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equality and school choice now supplement input equality.  But 
equality in separate schools will prove as illusory both today and in 
the future as it did under Plessey. 
School segregation is also socially acceptable, because modern 
reform efforts have transformed schools from providers of a broad-
based education in all facets of life to merely academic factories 
producing students with adequate test scores.  The current reform 
movements wholly ignore the value schools have  
not only for [their] impact on student academic learning but also 
for [their] central role in building the nation, socializing children, 
preparing citizens, communicating the basic values of our 
Constitution and democratic system, and helping immigrants 
from every part of the globe work and live together peacefully 
and successfully in a single democracy.301   
In short, the separate schools of today no longer need the “but equal” 
excuse. They are separate without justification.  Today’s schools are 
separate and equal, often proudly so, rather than separate but equal. 
What the courts, legislatures, and society refuse to accept is that 
socioeconomically and therefore racially isolated schools are 
inherently inferior, even when not state sanctioned.  Only the path of 
integration, which was traveled for only a short distance, leads to 
equal educational opportunity and societal benefits unattainable in 
school finance cases, school choice or under the NCLB.  Integration, 
and not resource and outcome equalization, is the best means to 
achieve equal educational opportunities.302  Indeed, not one single 
 
 301. Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 11. See also id. at 12 (American schools “have always 
been seen as ways to educate the coming generation to be good citizens, successful workers, and 
able to function more successfully in the diverse society America has become”). 
 302. McUsic, supra note 23, at 1355 (“[I]ntegration is the best, and perhaps only, way to 
provide an equal educational opportunity.”); Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, supra note 49, at 
289, 297, 315 (integration creates academic and social benefits that cannot be duplicated in 
modern era reforms); Richard Hunter & RoSusan Bartee, The Achievement Gap, 35 EDUC. & URB. 
SOC’Y 151, 158 (2003) (the last time there were systematic reductions in test score gaps was during 
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school district has created resegregated schools that are equal.303  The 
separate but equal path we now tread is a downhill route, and our 
momentum will increase the longer we stay on it. 
Many avenues exist to derail American education from its current 
segregation track, but who will pursue them?  With federally 
mandated desegregation ending and the public’s focus concentrated 
on choice, funding and outcome equality, there is no reason to 
believe that race-based initiatives will take root.304  The Supreme 
Court forcefully explained why integrated schools are important: 
[S]tudent body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better 
prepares students for and increasingly diverse workforce and 
society, and better prepares them as professionals . . . American 
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s 
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through 
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and 
viewpoints.305 
Despite the importance of a diverse education, school rankings 
for public consumption under the NCLB for K–12 schools, as well as 
U.S News & World Report for higher education, do not even 
consider racial composition.  The public either believes that 
minimum academic standards and adequate funding will secure their 
 
the integration era); Ryan, The Influence of Race, supra note 12, at 481 (“Not only does integration 
carry with it educational benefits that school finance reform fails to provide, it also appears to 
carry with it financial benefits and financial stability that school finance litigation has been unable 
to deliver to predominantly minority districts.”). 
 303. Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 10. 
 304. See, e.g., Levit, supra note 90, at 456–57 (arguing that separation by race is accepted by 
society today); Rahdert, supra note 47, at 806 (“[C]hanges seem unlikely simply as a matter of 
political will.”).  Professor Rahdert believes that nothing will change with respect to race-based 
initiatives within the next fifty years.  Id. at 805, 809.  See also Chemerinsky, supra note 50, at 1472 
(“[T]here seems neither the political nor judicial will to deal with the growing segregation and 
inequalities in American schools.”); Frankenberg et al., supra note 6, at 67 (there is no leadership 
pushing for integration); Ryan, Suburban Veto, supra note 166, at 1644 (districts and states are 
not adopting voluntary desegregation plans); Ryan and Heise, supra note 44, at 2057 (there is no 
organized support for mandatory integration). 
 305. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003). 
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place in the global economy or that education’s role is not to impart 
social values, as these interests have yet to convince the middle class 
to integrate increasingly segregated schools.  The NCLB, school 
choice, and finance reform feed these beliefs into the future. 
Justice Ginsburg predicted that race-based admissions policies to 
higher education would be unnecessary in twenty-five years because 
minority achievement will approach white achievement.306  Unless an 
unlikely push for integration emerges, the twenty-five year window 
will close with further disparity in the achievement gap.  Separate but 
equal schools will remain the default method to achieve minority 
equality so long as integration is not forced upon us, and inherent 
inequality will persist in our schools. 
 
 306. Id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
